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ARTICLE
ABANDONING PRINCIPLES: QUALIFIED TUITION PROGRAMS
AND WEALTH TRANSFER TAXATION DOCTRINE
Wayne M. Gazur"
In 1996 Congress gave its imprimatur to a modest qualified tuition program provision.
Over the course of the next five years the provision was expanded, providing additional
wealth transfer taxation and income taxation benefits. This essay proposes that unless
limited, such benefits are inconsistent with established taxation principles and also have
the potential to undermine the integrity of the wealth transfer tax structure and the
progressive nature of the income tax.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction ............................................. 2
II. An Overview of the Income Tax Treatment of § 529 Plans ........ 5
A. The Rise and Refinement of the § 529 Plan ................ 5
B. The Coverdell Education Savings Account Comparison ...... 9
C. The Retirement Savings Account and Lifetime Savings Account
Initiative ........................................... 12
III. Section 529 Plan Inconsistencies with Established Federal Wealth
Transfer Tax Principles .................................. 13
A. Alternative § 529 Plan Ownership Structures .............. 13
B. Section 529's Inconsistencies with Wealth Transfer Tax
D octrine ........................................... 16
1. The 1996 Act's Approach to § 529 .................. 16
2. The 1997 Act's Change of Direction ................. 18
* Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Law. The author gratefully acknowledges
the helpful comments of Edward J. Gac and Robert M. Phillips in reviewing an early draft of this essay.
PITTSBURGH TAX REVIEW
a. The Deemed Completed Gift ................... 20
b. The Future Interest Exemption .................. 21
c. The Special Five-Year Election ................. 23
d. The Shift of Generations Rule .................. 25
e. The Broad Estate Tax Exemption ................ 28
IV. Assessing § 529's Favored Status .......................... 30
A. Incremental Repeal of the Wealth Transfer Taxes or Simply
Another Loophole? ....................  ............. 30
B. The Special Status of Education Incentives ............... 33
C . Sim plicity ......................................... 36
D. Incentives, Subsidies, and Loopholes .................... 37
V . Fixing § 529 ........................................... 39
A. Revisiting the 1996 Act ............................... 39
B. Improving the 1996 Act ............................... 40
1. Wealth Transfer Tax Modifications .................. 40
2. Income Tax Modifications ......................... 42
C. A Potential Empty Victory of Principles .................. 44
VI. Conclusions ........................................... 47
I. INTRODUCTION
The Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996 (the "1996 Act")'
introduced the § 529 prepaid tuition plan as a new tax-advantaged savings
vehicle for education expenses. The prepaid tuition concept was not
altogether new because the statute was in part enacted to clarify the treatment
of prepaid tuition plans that had been already created by several states without
specific guidance in the Internal Revenue Code (the "Code").2 Congress
subsequently refined both the income tax and wealth transfer tax aspects of
the statute on repeated occasions,3 including changes enacted with the
1. Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, 110 Stat. 1755 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of the Code).
2. Prior to the enactment of § 529, several states had created prepaid tuition programs with mixed
results. See generally Eric A. Lustig, Taxation of Prepaid Tuition Plans and the 1997 Tax
Provisions-Middle Class Panacea or Placebo? Continuing Problems and Variations on a Theme, 31
AKRON L.REv. 229,240-52 (1997) (discussingthe history of prepaid tuition plans predatingthe enactment
of § 529).
3. In addition to changes intmduced with the named tax acts identified in the accompanying text,
two untitled technical amendment bills in part further tinkered with § 529. See Consolidated
Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 319(5), 114 Stat. 2763, 2763A-646 (2000) (changing the
definition of qualifying room and board under I.R.C. § 529(e)(3)(B)); Act of July 26, 2001, Pub. L. No.
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Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 (the "1997 Act"),4 the Internal Revenue Service
Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998,5 the Economic Growth and Tax Relief
Reconciliation Act of 2001 (the "2001 Act"),6 and the Job Creation and
Worker Assistance Act of 2002 (the "2002 Act").7
The promising tax and estate planning aspects of the provision received
a lot of attention in planning literature, particularly after the 2001 Act
expanded the tax benefits to include an income tax exemption for plan
earnings used to pay qualified higher education expenses Several accounts
suggest that taxpayers are also increasingly embracing the new savings
vehicle, with some predicting total investment in § 529 plans of $200 billion
by 2007.
107-22, § 1(b)(3)(C), 115 Stat. 196, 197 (changing the references to "education individual retirement
accounts" to references to "Coverdell education savings accounts").
4. Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L No. 105-34, 111 Stat. 788 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of the Code).
5. InternalRevenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L.No. 105-206,112 Stat.
685 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the Code).
6. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115 Stat. 38
(codified as amended in scattered sections of the Code).
7. Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2002, Pub. L No. 107-147, 116 Stat. 21 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of the Code).
8. A July 14, 2004 search of the Westlaw 'TP-All" library for articles prior to 2001 yielded 15
references (Query: 529 /5 tuition & DA (Before 2001)) and 51 references for articles after 2001 (Query:
529 /5 tuition & DA (After 2001)). For some of the commentary, see, for example, Beverly R. Budin,
Section 529 Plans: What They Are and Who Should Use Them, 35 INST. ON EST. PLAN. 800 (2001); Ellen
D. Cook, Navigating the Muddy Waters of College Financial Planning, 69 PRAC. TAX STRATEGIES 286
(2002); Chad C. Coombs & Boyd D. Hudson, Section 529 Plans Offer Another Way to Save for College,
25 L.A. LAW. 16 (2002); Jim Hamilton, Notice 2001-55 and the Rapid Growth of 529 Plans, 45 RES
GESTAE 29 (2002); Cynthia Sharp Myers, Tax Breaks for Education Savings, 214 N.J. LAW. 23 (2002);
Michael Schlesinger, Qualified State Tuition Programs: More Favorable After 2001 Act, 28 EST. PLAN.
412 (2001); Martin M. Shenkman, Planning Opportunities to Help Families Fund a Child s Education,
30 EST. PLAN. 24 (2003); Barbara A. Taylor & Joseph A. Cipparone, New Tax Breaks Compete with
Traditional Wealth-Transfer Strategies, 68 PRAC. TAX STRATEGIES 141 (2002); Regina Rathnau, Note,
College Prep: What Every ConsumerShould KnowAbout Education Expenses and the Economic Growth
& Tax ReliefAct of2001, 14 LoY. CONSUMER L. REV. 57 (2001).
9. See Danielle A. Merrick, 529: States' Nightmare, Estate Planners 'Dream, 59 J. Mo. B. 316
(2003) ($200 billion in plan assets expected by 2007); Andy Hagar, Expanding Markets: College
Planning, UGMAs and Section 529 Plans, ROUGH NOTES, June 1, 2001, at 44, available at 2001 WL
13336610 (quoting a financial advisor who "heard other financial experts estimate upwards of $1 trillion
in contributions to 529 plans in the next five to seven years"); Howard Isenstein, As College Plans
Proliferate, It Pays to Shop Around, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2004, § 3 (Sunday Business), at 8 ("Assets in
the plans rose to $40 billion at the end of the first quarter [2004], from about $9.2 billion at the end of
2001."); Trevor Thomas, 529 Assets Surge, but Advisors Say the Plans Aren't for Everyone, NAT'L
UNDERWRITER LIFE & HEALTH-FINANCIAL SERVICES EDITION, June 28, 2004, available at 2004 WL
66336595 (estimated $40 billion in § 529 plan assets as of first quarter 2004).
2004]
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An essay addressing the federal wealth transfer taxation considerations
of § 529 plans could at first blush promise to be an essay about little because
the statute is designed to be extremely forgiving in terms of wealth transfer
taxes. Section 529 plans benefit from very favorable gift tax rules coupled
with an exemption from estate taxation that is very broad and generally
inconsistent with established wealth transfer taxation principles. This essay
explores the nature of those inconsistencies and the broader implications for
the federal wealth transfer taxation system.
Like many of the provisions liberalized by the 2001 Act, § 529 will sunset
for taxable years beginning after December 31, 2010.0 The potential
extension of § 529 should provide an opportunity for Congress to reassess the
appropriateness of its structure. In that regard, this essay argues that in its
current form, § 529 provides an education subsidy in the form of wealth
transfer tax and income tax exemptions that is most attractive and helpful to
the wealthiest taxpayers, but who probably need financial aid for higher
education the least. This is inconsistent with other education tax incentives
that impose limits on amounts and eligibility for contributions, reserving the
provisions for taxpayers who have greater need of financial assistance.
Furthermore, the § 529 plan tax exemptions detract from the integrity of the
wealth transfer tax system and the progressive nature of the income tax
structure.
Part II presents an overview of the income taxation of § 529 plans. Part
III discusses how the wealth transfer taxation of § 529 plans is inconsistent
with longstanding wealth transfer taxation principles. Part IV addresses the
broader implications of § 529 plans and Part V recommends some changes.
Part VI concludes the essay.
10. See 2001 Act, Pub. L No. 107-16, § 901, 115 Stat. 38, 150.
[Vol. 2:1
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II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE INCOME TAX TREATMENT OF § 529 PLANS
A. The Rise and Refinement of the § 529 Plan
Section 529 permits state governments (and private educational
institutions)" to sponsor "qualified tuition programs."' 2  Although § 529
prescribes overall requirements for a qualified plan, the plan sponsors are free
to craft their own variations within those guidelines. 3 All 50 states and the
District of Columbia now sponsor some form of qualified tuition program. 4
In many cases a private, for-profit money management firm operates the
plan. 5 Section 529 plans can be complex financial products, raising issues
about the level of fees and the quality of disclosures. 6
There are two distinct types of § 529 plans, although the statute refers to
both as "qualified tuition programs." In a prepaid tuition program, a person
purchases tuition credits or certificates on behalf of a designated beneficiary
that entitle the beneficiary to the waiver or payment of qualified higher
education expenses.' Generally, the purchaser pays a current, discounted
11. As enacted in the 1996 Act, § 529 permitted only state sponsorship of tuition programs. 1996
Act, Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1806, 110 Stat. 1755, 1895. The 2001 Act expanded § 529 to permit offerings
by private educational institutions starting in 2002. 2001 Act, Pub. L No. 107-16, § 402, 116 Stat. 21,
60-61 (codified at I.R.C. § 529(b)(1)). However, private educational institution plans remained more
limited in some respects than those available to states. See I.R.C. § 529(b)(1).
12. I.R.C. § 529(b)(1).
13. See Merrick, supra note 9, at 316 ('The result has been that virtually every state's plan is
unique.").
14. For a comparison of selected aspects of § 529 plan offerings for all states, see http://
www.savingforcollege.com (last visited July 7, 2004).
15. The State, agency, or instrumentality must still be actively involved in setting policy for the plan.
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.529-2(b)(2), 63 Fed. Reg. 45,019, 45,027 (Aug. 24, 1998).
16. See, e.g., Sandra Block, College Savings Plans Cut Fees, Roll Out New Options, USA TODAY,
June 8,2004, at B.03, available at2004 WL 58558260 ("Several plans have reduced fees, added low-cost
options and distanced themselves from scandal-scarred funds."); Albert B. Crenshaw, No Quick Fix for
Section 529 Plans, WASH. POST, June 6, 2004, at F04, available at 2004 WL 74493101 (identifying
"complaints that ... programs are plagued by excessive fees and unintelligible investment information");
Isnstein, supra note 9, at 8 ("But now some regulators, financial analysts and members of Congress are
concerned that some brokers and investment companies are charging too much. Often, they say, fees are
so high that they outweigh the plans' tax benefits."). One analysis finds that while fees can erase the tax
advantages of § 529 plans, higher income families subject to higher marginal rates of income taxes have
more cushion in that regard before the fees render the investment disadvantageous. See Susan Dynarski,
Who Benefits from the Education Saving Incentives? Income, Educational Expectations and the Value
of the 529 and Coverdell, 57 NAT'L TAX J. 359, 362-63 (2004).
17. I.R.C. § 529(b)(1).
18. Id. § 529(b)(1)(A)(I).
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price for an amount of future tuition, and that future amount is guaranteed and
not dependent on investment returns. A prepaid tuition program is generally
viewed as a more conservative investment approach. Private universities can
sponsor only prepaid tuition programs. 9 Alternatively, in an education
savings account structure, a person makes contributions to an account" and
the contributions are invested, with the ultimate distributions dependent on the
account's investment returns. 2' By most accounts, the education savings
account is the more popular structure.22
The income tax treatment of investment returns during the § 529 plan's
accumulation phase has remained substantially intact since the statute's
inception in the 1996 Act.23 No person, whether the purchaser or the
designated beneficiary, recognizes taxable income from any growth of the
account.24 However, under the 1996 Act, the investment returns were taxable
when distributed.25 To discourage improper use of this income tax deferral
privilege, a qualified tuition program was required to impose "a more than de
minimis penalty on any refund of earnings from the account"26 that was used
for other than "qualified higher education expenses." '27 For this purpose,
"qualified higher education expenses" included tuition, fees, books, supplies,
and equipment required for the enrollment of the designated beneficiary, but
no living expenses.2" Consequently, the principal benefit offered by § 529
19. See id. § 529(b)(1). In addition, the income tax exemption for growth or earnings of the
qualified tuition program did not apply to distributions from a plan sponsored by an educational institution
for any taxable year beginning before January 1, 2004. Id. § 529(c)(3)(B)(iii).
20. Id. § 529(b)(1)(A)(ii).
21. A program will not be treated as qualified unless it provides that a contributor or designated
beneficiary "may not directly or indirectly direct the investment of any contributions to the program (orany
earnings thereon)." Id. § 529(b)(4). However, the proposed regulations permit an account owner to select
among different investment strategies at the time the initial contribution is made to the account. Prop.
Treas. Reg. § 1.529-2(g), 63 Fed. Reg. 45,019,45,028 (Aug. 24, 1998). In addition, the Service permits
the account owner to change the plan investments once a year. LR.S. Notice 2001-55, 2001-2 C.B. 299.
22. See, e.g., Susan T. Bart & Lauren J. Wolven, College Savings Accounts: Why All the Buzz?,
14 CBA REc. 46 (2000) (stating that college savings accounts are more popular than prepaid tuition plans);
DavidM. Pfefferkom, The Investment ofCustodial Funds in Section 529 Qualified Tuition Programs: Tax
Advantages and Fiduciary Concerns, 30 EST. PLAN. 571, 573 (2003) (stating that savings plans are more
popularthan prepaid tuition plans); Steven B. Boehm, The Regulation of529 Plans, SJ026 ALI-ABA 105,
110 (ALI-ABA Continuing Leg. Educ. Oct. 16-17, 2003) (Although prepaid tuition plans regained some
popularity with a poor overall stock market, the savings account structure remains more popular.).
23. CompareI.R.C. §529(c)(1),with 1996Act, Pub.L.No. 104-188, § 1806, 110Stat. 1755, 1896.
24. I.R.C. § 529(c)(1).
25. 1996 Act § 1806, 110 Stat. at 1896-97.
26. Id., 10 Stat. at 1896.
27. Id.
28. Id., 110 Stat. at 1898.
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plans was the deferral of income tax on investment earnings and a shifting of
the ultimate tax burden to the designated beneficiary who usually would be in
a lower income tax bracket than the contributor at the time the funds were
distributed.29
Congress revisited the statute in the 1997 Act and sweetened the
provisions by expanding the definition of qualified higher education expenses
to include an allowance for room and board.30 Nevertheless, the plans
continued to serve as only income tax deferral and shifting structures.
The election of a Republican administration in 2000 that was committed
to "tax relief' as a policy imperative produced the 2001 Act. With respect to
§ 529 plans, the 2001 Act established the plans' highly attractive income tax
benefit-permanent exemption from income tax. If distributions are used to
pay only qualified higher education expenses, no income taxes will ever be
imposed on the increase in value of the account or earnings on the account.3
"Qualified higher education expenses" for this purpose include tuition, fees,
supplies and equipment, and room and board. 2 To the extent distributions are
not used for higher education expenses,33 the allocable share of investment
earnings is included in taxable income and a ten percent penalty is also
imposed on such earnings.34 However, excess funds can be redirected to a
new designated beneficiary without penalty, and for that purpose the statute
permits the designation from a broad class of family members.35 The income
29. See id., 110 Stat. at 1896-97 (current version at LR.C. § 529(c)(3)(A)) ("Any distribution...
shall be includible in the gross income of the distributee ...."). Most students entering college would be
older than 14, which would preclude application of the "kiddie tax" prescribed by I.R.C. § l(g).
30. Compare 1996 Act, Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1806, 100 Stat. 1755, 1898, with 1997 Act, Pub.
L. No. 105-34, § 211, 111 Stat. 788, 810-12.
31. 2001 Act, Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 402,115 Stat. 38, 60-63.
32. Id. § 402(f), 115 Stat. at 63 (codified at I.R.C. § 529(e)(3)(A)(I)).
33. Under the 1996 Act's version of § 529(b)(3), the plan sponsor had responsibility to impose
penalties for refunds of earnings not used for qualified higher education expenses. 1996 Act, Pub. L. No.
104-188, § 1806, 110 Stat. 1755, 1896 (current version at LR.C. § 529(b)(3)). The proposed regulations
permitted several alternative ways to verify payment of the qualified higher education expenses such as
direct payment, a joint check to the designated beneficiary and the education institution, the submission
of proofof expenditures prior to the distribution, and certification prior to the distribution of intent to make
such expenditures, followed by substantiation of the expenditures following the distribution. Prop. Treas.
Reg. § 1.529-2(e)(4), 63 Fed. Reg. 45,019, 45,027-28 (Aug. 24, 1998). With the 2001 Act's elimination
of the plan-imposed penalty, the Service announced that the final regulations will not require the policing
of distributions as originally proposed. I.R.S. Notice 2001-81, 2001-2 C.B. 617.
34. I.R.C. §§ 529(c)(6), 530(d)(4).
35. Section 529(c)(3)(C)(i)(II) permits a rollover to"another designated beneficiary under a qualified
tuition program who is a member of the family of the designated beneficiary with respect to which the
distribution was made." Section 529(eX2) in turn defines "family" for this purpose, and designated
beneficiaries may be drawn from the class composed of the spouse of the beneficiary; a son or daughter (or
20041
PITTSBURGH TAX REVIEW
tax benefits of § 529 plans are not confined to the federal level because many
states allow a state income tax deduction or credit for contributions made to
the state's qualified tuition program.36
The income tax benefit of the § 529 plan is not unqualified because
"double benefit" prohibitions generally preclude the student from claiming
other deductions or credits for tuition expenses to the extent that they are paid
with the tax-exempt earnings from the plan.37 However, that drawback is
confined to the payment of tuition and related fees, as there generally is no
deduction or credit for room and board. In addition, the deductions or credits
are generally subject to limits in amount,38 plus eligibility limits based on the
income of the student.39 Accordingly, as tuition costs increase (or the income
of the student increases) the residual benefits of the § 529 plan increase. A
student at a community college might be more interested in the benefits of the
Hope Scholarship Credit4" than in § 529 benefits, but a student at an expensive
private university might be more interested in the § 529 plan benefits.
their descendant) of the beneficiary; a stepson or stepdaughter of the beneficiary; a brother, sister,
stepbrother, or stepsister of the beneficiary; a father or mother (or their ancestor) of the beneficiary, a
stepfather or stepmother of the beneficiary; a son or daughter of a brother or sister of the beneficiary, a
brother or sister of the beneficiary's mother or father; a son-in-law, daughter-in-law, father-in-law, mother-
in-law, brother-in-law, or sister-in-lawof the beneficiary, a spouse ofany of thepreceding individuals; and
a first cousin of the beneficiary. While the scope of collateral relatives is somewhat limited, the statute in
part incorporates the familial standard of § 152(a)(1), which includes "[a] son or daughter of the taxpayer,
or a descendant of either." This rollover scheme to the "designated beneficiary" from the "taxpayer"
apparently permits unlimited rollover to the descendants of the original designated beneficiary.
36. According to one source, 23 states plus the District of Columbia allow a state income tax
deduction or credit for all or some portion of § 529 plan contributions. See The Internet Guide to Funding
College: State Tax Benefits and Other Enhancements, at http://www.savingforcollege.com/529_plans/
the 529 evaluator/index.php (access document by seleting "State Tax Benefits and Other Enhancements"
from the "Compare by Question" drop down menu) (last visited Aug. 1,2004). Generally speaking, states
that adopt a federal definition of gross income usually recognize a correlative state income tax exemption
for § 529 plan earnings, but the exceptions defy a coast-to-coast summary. The website cited above
summarizes the state-by-state variations.
37. See, e.g., IR.C. § 222(c)(2) (no deduction for tuition and fees paid with an amount of earnings
excluded under a § 529 plan); id. § 529(c)(3)(B)(v) (qualified higher education expenses for the § 529 plan
are reduced by tuition costs taken into account in computing a Hope Scholarship Credit or Lifetime
Learning Credit).
38. See, e.g., id. § 222(b)(2) ($2,000 or $4,000 limit on the deduction); id. § 25A(b)(1) (maximum
credit of $2,000 for Hope Scholarship Credit); id. § 25A(c) (maximum credit of $2,000 for Lifetime
Learning Credit).
39. See, e.g., id. § 222(b)(2) (income limitation for tuition deduction); id. § 25A(d) (income
limitation for Hope Scholarship Credit).
40. Id. § 25A(b).
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B. The Coverdell Education Savings Account Comparison
The education provisions of the 1997 Act were the product of a
compromise between President Clinton's agenda of deductions or credits for
tuition costs and a Republican vision of permanently tax-exempt savings
vehicles.4' The 1997 Act introduced two new education incentives, the Hope
Scholarship Credit and Lifetime Learning Credit,42 which reflected President
Clinton's proposals. The 1997 Act also introduced an above-the-line
deduction for student loan interest, 43 and the "education individual retirement
account," 4  which was generally a Republican proposal. "Education
individual retirement account" was an inappropriate title because the account
had nothing to do with retirement. It was later renamed the "Coverdell
Education Savings Account."'5
The "Roth IRA" and its model of nondeductible contributions but
potentially tax-exempt distributions"6 was also introduced by the 1997 Act.
47
The Roth IRA and the Coverdell Education Savings Account both reflect, to
varying degrees, the fundamental precepts of earlier savings proposals such
as the "American Dream Savings account" proposed by the House of
41. The path to enactment of the 1997 Act was full of turns and compromises, but the overall
convictions of the parties were reflected in a comparison of proposed tax incentives prepared by the staff
of the Joint Committee on Taxation in March 1997. See generally STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N,
105TH CONG., COMPARISON OF CERTAIN PROPOSED TAX INCENTIVES FOR HIGHER EDUCATION (Comm.
Print 1997). President Clinton's fiscal 1998 budget proposal included a Hope Scholarship tuition tax credit
and a deduction for other tuition and fees, id. at 2-5, and an exclusion from income for loan forgiveness
by tax-exempt charitable organizations, id. at 7-8. The Safe and Affordable Schools Act of 1997, S.1,
105th Cong., and the Balanced Budget Act of 1995, H.R. 2530, 104th Cong. (vetoed by President Clinton),
contained none of these provisions. On the other hand, the two latter bills included a deduction for student
loan interest, STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, supra, at 5-6, and "Bob Dole education investment
accounts" and "American Dream Savings Accounts," respectively, id. at 9-11, that would permit tax-free
distributions from savings accounts to pay for higher education costs.
42. 1997 Act, Pub. L.No. 105-34, § 201, 111 Stat. 788, 799-806 (current version atI.R.C. § 25A).
43. Id. § 202, 111 Stat. at 806-09 (current version at I.R.C. § 221).
44. Id. § 213, 111 Stat. at 813-18 (current version at I.R.C. § 530).
45. The name change was made on July 26,2001, to honor Senator Paul D. Coverdell (R-Ga.), who
passed away on July 18, 2000. Craig D. Bell & Maureen C. Ackerly, A Primer: Section 529 Plans,
CoverdellEducation Savings Accounts (Education IRAs), and Other Tax-Smart Ways to Save for College,
ARMY LAW., Apr. 2004, at 38 n.94; see also Act of July 26, 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-22, 115 Stat. 196.
Senator Coverdell was a vigorous proponent of tax-exempt savings accounts for education expenses,
including expenses for elementary and secondary education. Bell & Ackerly, supra, at 38 n.94.
46. I.R.C. § 408A(d) (In general, distributions are tax exempt if the distributee is at least age 59
and the account has been established for at least five years.).
47. 1997 Act, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 302, 111 Stat. 788, 825-29 (current version at I.R.C. § 408A).
2004)
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Representatives' Republican majority in its "Contract with America."4 The
American Dream Savings account concept employed nondeductible
contributions, but distributions were tax-free so long as a five year holding
period was satisfied and the withdrawals were used to pay for tuition and fees
of family members or certain first-time homebuyer expenses and medical
expenses. 9
The Coverdell Education Savings Account, like the § 529 plan, allows the
invested amounts to accumulate free of any current income taxes.5" However,
from its inception in the 1997 Act, the Coverdell Education Savings Account
also offered a complete income tax exemption for investment earnings to the
extent the distributee expended all of the funds on qualified higher education
expenses."' As discussed in the previous section, a similar exemption was not
extended to § 529 plans until the 2001 Act,5" although such an exemption was
proposed earlier during the consideration of the 1997 Act.53
The Roth IRA54 and the Coverdell Education Savings Account both
remain much more highly circumscribed savings vehicles in comparison with
the § 529 plan. For example, both the Roth IRA and the Coverdell Education
Savings Account impose quite modest annual contribution limits55 as well as
phase-outs of eligibility for contributions based on adjusted gross income
levels. 6 In comparison, § 529 only requires that plans impose a limit on the
48. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, 104TH CONG., DESCRIPTION OF THE "CONTRACT WITH
AMERICA TAX RELIEF ACT OF 1995," at 6-7 (Comm. Print 1995).
49. Id.
50. I.R.C. §§ 530(a), 529(a).
51. 1997 Act § 213, 111 Stat. at 814-15 (codified atl.R.C. § 530(d)(2)). During the negotiations
preceding the enactment of the 1997 Act, some Republicans insisted that the Coverdell Education Savings
Account be expanded to include the payment of expenses for elementary and secondary education. See,
e.g., Lauren Shepherd, GOP Wants "Education IRAs " Expanded; Congress: Leadership Promises Drive
to Include Private School Tuition, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 2, 1997, at A12, available at 1997 WL 2234499;
Gov't Press Release, Paul Coverdell, Coverdell, Lott & Speaker Gingrich Introduce Education Savings
Accounts (Aug. 1, 1997), available at 1997 WL 12101620. President Clinton consistently opposed these
proposals, but they were ultimately enacted in 2001. 2001 Act, Pub. L No. 107-16, § 401 (c), 115 Stat. 38,
57-58 (codified at I.R.C. § 530(b)(4)).
52. 2001 Act § 402(b)(1), 115 Stat. at 61 (codified at I.R.C. § 529(c)(3)(B)(ii)(1)).
53. Title III of Senate Bill I would have made distributions from a § 529 plan tax exempt if used
for qualified higher education expenses. Affordable College Act, S. 1,105th Cong. § 303(a) (1996).
54. Although the Roth IRA is primarily a retirement savings vehicle, the provisions do permit tax-
free withdrawals for qualified higher education expenses, medical expenses, and a limited amount for the
acquisition of a home by first-time homebuyers. LR.C. § 408A(d)(2XAXiv); see also id. § 72(t)(2)
(defining qualified special purpose distribution).
55. Id. § § 219(b)(5), 408A(c)(2) (Roth IRAannual contribution limits of$3,000 or $3,500 in 2004);
id. § 530(b)(1)(A) (Coverdell Education Savings Account annual contribution limit of $2,000).
56. Id. § 408A(c)(3) (Roth IRA limits on the contributor's income); id. § 530(c)(1) (Coverdell
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overall amount of contributions so they are not "in excess of those necessary
to provide for the qualified higher education expenses of the beneficiary." '57
One state plan interprets this provision as allowing as much as a stunning
$315,270 in accumulated plan assets per designated beneficiary and limits in
the $250,000 range are quite common." The limitation is apparently
interpreted as a state-by-state limit that could be possibly circumvented by
establishing multiple § 529 plan accounts for the same designated beneficiary
in different states. 9 Furthermore, § 529 imposes no limits on the tax
exemption based on the income levels of the contributor or the distributee. If
he desired, Bill Gates could establish § 529 plans for his children to help
defray the costs of their education. And, with Mr. Gates presumably being
taxed at the highest marginal income tax rates, that income tax exemption
would be of greatest benefit to him and other similarly situated high-income
taxpayers.6"
Contributions may not be made to a Coverdell Education Savings
Account after the beneficiary reaches age 18,6" and generally must be
distributed within 30 days after the beneficiary reaches age 30.62 Section 529
Education Savings Account limits on the contributor's income).
57. Id. § 529(b)(6).
58. Rhode Island's plan adopts the $315,270 limit. The Louisianaplan's $205,175 cap is the lowest
and went into effect on August 1, 2004, bringing every states' plan limit above $200,000. See The Internet
Guide to Funding College: Maximum Contributions, at http://www.savingforcollege.com/529_plans/
the 529 evaluator/indexphp(accessdocumentbyselecting"MaximumContributions" from the "Compare
by Question" drop down menu) (last visited Oct. 16, 2004).
59. The operative language of § 529 states: "A program shall not be treated as a qualified tuition
program unless it provides adequate safeguards to prevent contributions on behalf of a designated
beneficiary in excess of those necessary to provide for the qualified higher education expenses of the
beneficiary." I.R.C. § 529(b)(6). One could read that provision to apply only to the program in question
or alternatively to require consideration of all programs. Another provision states: "For purposes of
applying [§] 72. . . to the extent provided by the Secretary, all qualified tuition programs of which an
individual is a designated beneficiary shall be treated as one program." Id. § 529(c)(3)(D)(I). Section 72,
however, deals with the taxability of distributions, not with the amount of contributions. Id. § 72(e)(9).
Indeed, the proposed regulations adopt aggregation in the context of "calculating the earnings portion of
any distribution." Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.529-3(d), 63 Fed. Reg. 45,019, 45,030 (Aug. 24, 1998). The
Service has announced that it will aggregate all plans sponsored by a state for purposes of the contribution
limit, but that apparently does not extend to plans sponsored by multiple states for the same beneficiary.
See I.R.S. Notice 2001-81, 2001-2 C.B. 617. In comparison, the Roth IRAprovisions clearlyannounce an
"all plans" aggregation rule: "The aggregate amount of contributions for any taxable year to all Roth IRAs
maintained for the benefit of an individual ... " I.R.C. § 408A(c)(2).
60. In an analysis of the impact of marginal income tax rates on § 529 plan investments, one
commentator found that"[the largest increases in returns accrue to the highest income group, both in dollar
terms and relative terms." Dynarski, supra note 16, at 370.
61. I.R.C. § 530(b)(l)(A)(ii).
62. Id. § 530(b)(l)(E), (d)(7).
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imposes no age limitations of this type, although the state plan sponsor may
impose them.63
C. The Retirement Savings Account and Lifetime Savings Account
Initiative
This essay will later propose that restrictions resembling those applicable
to the Roth IRA and Coverdell Education Savings Account be extended to
§ 529 plans to discourage abuse of the § 529 plan advantages to preserve the
integrity of the wealth transfer tax system and to promote progressivity of the
federal income tax structure.64 However, the existing limits on the Roth IRA
and Coverdel I Education Savings Account may be eliminated to some degree
by proposals for broader savings incentives.
For example, in February of 2004, President Bush's 2005 Budget
proposed the creation of four new savings accounts: the Retirement Savings
Account ("RSA"); the Lifetime Savings Account ("LSA"); the Employer
Retirement Savings Account; and the Individual Development Account.65 The
Roth IRA would be renamed the RSA.66 Unlike the current Roth IRA, the
RSA would include no income limits.67 Nondeductible annual contributions
of $5,000 (indexed for inflation) would be allowed.68 Earnings would
accumulate tax-free, and qualified distributions after age 58 would be tax-
free.69
The LSA would provide for nondeductible $5,000 annual contributions
(indexed for inflation), and would contain no income limits or age limits.7
Earnings would accumulate tax-free and all distributions would be excluded
from gross income with no minimum holding requirement." While
individuals could continue to contribute to Coverdell Education Savings
Accounts and § 529 plans, they could elect to convert balances from Coverdell
63. See. e.g., Taylor & Cipparone, supra note 8, at 142-43 (referring to Iowa's limit on
contributions for beneficiaries 18 years old or younger and provision that the account must be used by age
30 and Indiana's 25 year limit on account duration).
64. See infra Part V.
65. Press Release, Office of Public Affairs, The President's Savings Proposals: Tax-Free Savings
and Retirement Security Opportunities for all Americans (Feb. 2, 2004),available at http://www.treas.gov/






71. Office of Public Affairs, supra note 65.
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Education Savings Accounts and § 529 plans to LSAs.7 In early 2004, bills
were introduced in the House of Representatives and Senate to create LSAs
patterned after the President's budget proposal.73
While proposals of this nature may not be adopted immediately, such
developments may determine the future of § 529 plans. First, the direction of
tax legislation might be toward fewer limits on these types of accounts, so
looking to the current Roth IRA or Coverdell Education Savings Account as
models for reform may be misplaced. Second, although difficult to predict,
an LSA that permits annual contributions of $5,000 that can be withdrawn,
tax-free, for any purpose would seem to be a strong competitor for the
education-focused § 529 plan, except for taxpayers who wish to contribute
more than $5,000 annually.7 4 The enactment of LSA legislation would
probably make § 529 plans attractive almost exclusivelyto a wealthy clientele.
Third, the RSA and LSA proposals do not include estate tax exemptions so the
accounts are apparently includible in the gross estate of the account owner.75
Accordingly, the special estate tax exemption extended to § 529 plan assets76
would become even more attractive to wealthy individuals as compared to
LSAs, again suggesting the need for greater scrutiny of the appropriateness of
the § 529 plan exemption.
III. SECTION 529 PLAN INCONSISTENCIES WITH ESTABLISHED FEDERAL
WEALTH TRANSFER TAX PRINCIPLES
A. Alternative § 529 Plan Ownership Structures
The primary focus of the language and structure of § 529 is on two
parties: the contributor of the funds to the plan (the "contributor" or "donor")
and the future student who is the beneficiary of the plan (the "designated
72. Id.
73. H.R. 4078, 108th Cong. (2004); S. 2263, 108th Cong. (2004).
74. The proposed LSA would apply the contribution limit to the owner of the account, not to the
contributor, and one may make contributions to the accounts of other individuals. Office of Public Affairs,
supra note 65. Accordingly, parents could create LSAs for themselves, as well as separate LSAs for each
of their children. Several commentators speculate that the LSA proposal would greatly reduce taxpayer
interest in § 529 plans. See, e.g., Rick Miller, LSAs Could Threaten the Existence of 529s; Proponents of
College Savings Plans Express Concern to Government, INVESTMENT NEWS, Feb. 16, 2004, at 19,
available at 2004 WL 65581658; Ellen Uzelac, College Rivals: Keep Funding Your 529 Accounts, But
Watch Out for Proposed New LSAs, Which Could Give College Savings Plans a Run for Their Money,
RESEARCH, Apr. 1, 2004, at 19, available at 2004 WL 66371013.
75. See Office of Public Affairs, supra note 65.
76. I.R.C. § 529(c)(4).
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beneficiary"" or "distributee"T5 ).79 There can be a third party (the "account
owner"8 ) who establishes the account and exercises discretion with respect
to a number of matters such as the designation of the initial beneficiary and
new beneficiaries and choices of plan investments. 8' In many situations, such
as a parent contributing to a plan on behalf of a child, the contributor and the
account owner will be the same person. However, in other cases, if the terms
of the plan permit this, one could have multiple contributors, such as
grandparents, uncles, and aunts, with the child's parent as the account owner.
Certainly, most contributors expect that, barring unforeseen
circumstances such as the death of the child or the failure to pursue post-
secondary education, 2 the funds will be applied to the education expenses of
the designated beneficiary. Nevertheless, assumingthe inapplicability of trust
doctrine, 3 or the express creation of a trust or custodial account as discussed
below, the account owner may have the power to apply those funds for other
purposes and for the benefit of other persons, albeit incurring an income tax
77. Designated Beneficiary is defined as:
(1) The individual designated as the beneficiary of the account at the time an account is established
with the [qualified state tuition program]; (2) The individual who is designated as the new
beneficiary when beneficiaries are changed; and (3) The individual receiving the benefits
accumulated in the account as a scholarship in the case of a [qualified state tuition program]
account established by a State or local government or an organization described in [§] 501 (c)(3) and
exempt from taxation under [§] 501(a) as part of a scholarship program operated by such
government or organization.
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.529-1(c), 63 Fed. Reg. 45,019, 45,025 (Aug. 24, 1998) (emphasis in original).
78. "'Distributee means the designated beneficiary or the account owner who receives or is treated
as receiving a distribution from a [qualified state tuition program]." Id., 63 Fed. Reg. at 45,025-26
(emphasis in original).
79. I.R.C. § 529.
80. Account owner is defined as:
the person who, under the terms of the [qualified state tuition program] or anycontract setting forth
the terms under which contributions may be made to an account for the benefit of a designated
beneficiary, is entitled to select or change the designated beneficiaryof an account, to designate any
person other than the designated beneficiary to whom funds may be paid from the account, or to
receive distributions from the account if no such other person is designated.
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.529-1(c), 63 Fed. Reg. 45,019, 45,025 (Aug. 24, 1998) (emphasis in original).
81. The ability to choose investments, however, is limited by the statute. See supra note 21.
82. Section 529 plans provide only for post-secondary education. In comparison, Coverdell
Education Savings Accounts can be used to fund elementary and secondary education expenses. I.R.C.
§ 530(b)(4). The expansion of the Coverdell Education Savings Account provisions to include elementary
and secondary education expenses was a politically charged issue, and the amendment was belatedly
enacted with the 2001 Act. See supra note 51.
83. The account owner would typically argue that an expression of such intent by the contributor
is precatory language not rising to the level of a legal obligation. See WILLIAM M. MCGOVERN, JR. &
SHELDON F. KURTZ, WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES 218-20 (3d ed. 2004).
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and a ten percent penalty on the distributions not used for higher education
expenses. Indeed, the planning literature frequently refers to the power of the
account owner to request a refund of the account balance at any time.84
As discussed below, the existence of such powers of revocation, whether
or not exercised, would usually render a gift incomplete at the outset if the
contributor and the account owner are the same person. Furthermore, the
existence of such power on the part of the account owner, whether or not the
account owner is the contributor, would otherwise invoke application of the
estate tax under established wealth transfer taxation doctrine. 5 In response
to such concerns, the statute creates broad divergences from established
wealth transfer taxation principles.86 These inconsistencies are discussed in
the next section.
The power of revocation enjoyed by the account owner is apparently a
valued aspect of § 529 accounts because it provides a degree of flexibility not
otherwise achievable with irrevocable gifts."1 However, from the standpoint
of a contributor who is not also the account owner, the possible misapplication
of the § 529 plan funds could be a concern.88 Furthermore, even if the
contributor is also the account owner fornow, the contributor could have well-
founded concerns about the future of the account ownership if the contributor
were to pass away or otherwise become incapacitated. It is beyond the scope
of this essay to deal with these issues in any depth. However, a promising
solution is the creation of a custodianship under statutes such as the Uniform
84. E.g., Susan T. Bart, Planning for College Using Section 529 Savings Accounts, PRAC. TAX
LAw., Winter 2002, at 37, 47 ("If permitted by the state program, the account owner can direct a
nonqualified distribution to the account owner."); Lee Anne Fennell,Death, Taxes, and Cognition, 81 N.C.
L. REV. 567, 650 (2003) ("While plan details vary from state to state, refunds of the amount paid in (less
various administrative fees) are generally available, and manyplans pay some amount of interest as well.");
Rodney C. Koenig, Creating College Scholarships with Qualified State Tuition Programs, 14 PROB. &
PROP. 46, 48 (2000) ("If they are willing to accept being taxed on the accumulated income and are willing
to pay the penalty, however, the grandparents can withdraw the funds from the Code § 529 plan at will.");
Merrick, supra note 9, at 317 ("The alluring component of these plans is that a parent, grandparent, friend,
etc. can save fora minor's education, but never forfeit control oftheaccount."); TheodoreA. Miller& John
P. Driscoll, Jr., § 529 Savings Plans, 12 EXPERIENCE 28, 30 (2002) ("Therefore, the account owner can
reclaim the assets at any time for any reason.").
85. See infra Part III.B.2.e.
86. I.R.C. § 529(c)(2).
87. Bart, supra note 84, at 47; Fennell, supra note 84, at 650; Koenigsupra note 84, at 48; Merrick,
supra note 9, at 317; Miller& Driscoll, supra note 84, at 30.
88. Indeed, there are some reports ofproposals to limit the flexibility of the § 529 plan in this regard.
"[Tlhe [§] 529 itself is being targeted for refbrms that, if enacted, would diminish the product's appeal.
Chief among them: Instead of truly controlling the account, the 'owner' would become a custodian with
a duty to act on behalf of the account beneficiary." Uzelac, supra note 74.
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Transfers to Minors Acte9 or Uniform Gifts to Minors Act,9" or the express
creation of a trust.9 The contributor would transfer the funds to the
custodianship or trust. The custodian or trustee, as the case may be, would in
turn invest in the § 529 plan if permitted by the terms of the plan. If the trust
was irrevocable, and the contributor did not serve as trustee, some of the
wealth transfer tax doctrine inconsistencies discussed in the next section
would be addressed.
B. Section 529's Inconsistencies with Wealth Transfer Tax Doctrine
1. The 1996 Act's Approach to § 529
As originally enacted in the 1996 Act, the federal wealth transfer taxation
aspects of § 529 plans were roughly consistent with established doctrine, but
there were some significant contradictions.
89. UNIF. TRANSFERS TO MINORS ACT § 3, 8C U.L.A. 25 (2001). The custodial account is a simple
and less expensive alternative to create because the terms of the arrangement are dictated by statute. No
custodial agreement is required beyond a document identifying the beneficiary and the custodian. See id.
§§ 9 & 11, 8C U.LA. 36-38,46-47. Furthermore, the income is generally reported directlyon the federal
income tax return of the beneficiary so no separate federal income tax return is required. See Rev. Rul.
59-357, 1959-2 C.B. 212. Finally, for federal wealth transfer tax purposes, transfers to the custodian
qualify as gifts for which the annual gift exclusion can be claimed. I.R.C. § 2503(b), (c). However, the
custodial account suffers from inflexibility (as compared with a trust), particularly with respect to the
common requirement that the account be distributed when the beneficiary reaches a statutorily imposed age,
generally 18 or 21. See UNIF. TRANSFERS TO MINORS ACT § 20, 8C U.LA. 72-73 (2001). In a handful
of states, the distribution of the custodial funds can be delayed until the beneficiary reaches age 25. See,
e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 13.46.195(e) (2002); CAL. PROB. CODE § 3920.5 (West 1991 & Supp. 2004); NEV.
STAT. § 167.034 (2003). For an article discussing the implications of § 529 plan ownership by custodial
accounts, see Pfefferkom, supra note 22.
90. UNIF. GIFTS TO MINORS ACT (1966), 8A U.L.A. 297 (2003). The cited page in the Uniform
Laws Annotated volume no longer contains the text of the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act because the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws no longer recommends adoption of that
model act, preferring the more modem Uniform Transfers to Minors Act as a substitute. Indeed, by
referring to the list ofjurisdictions that have adopted the Uniform Transfers to Minors Act, one can infer
that South Carolina and Vermont are the two remaining states that still follow statutes patterned after the
Uniform Gifts to Minors Act. See Table of Jurisdictions Wherein Act Has Been Adopted, 8C U.L.A. 1-2
(2001); see also S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 20-7-140 to -240 (Law. Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 2003); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 14 §§ 3201-3209 (2002).
91. A trust of any sophistication will require a written trust agreement and possibly the filing of a
federal trust income tax return, Form 1041. Also, gifts to a typical discretionary trust generally do not
qualify for the annual gift exclusion afforded by § 2503(b) of the Code unless a so-called "Crummey clause"
is utilized. See infra notes 129-30 and accompanying text.
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First, the statute provided that a contribution to a § 529 plan was not
treated as a taxable gift.92 As discussed below, this was appropriate if the
donor was the account owner, because the revocable nature of§ 529 transfers,
as well as the ability to shift designated beneficiaries, would normally render
the gift incomplete.93 However, if the donor was not the account owner and
therefore lacked continuing control over the § 529 plan, the statute was
inconsistent with established principles that would generally dictate completed
gift treatment.
94
Second, consistent with established doctrine, when a distribution was
actually made to or for the benefit of a designated beneficiary, it was treated
as a gift at that time.95 However, if the distribution was made directly to the
educational institution, the statute provided that it was to be treated as a
qualified transfer under § 2503(e) of the Code, ultimately producing no
taxable gift.96 This was a bit of a stretch of the doctrine of § 2503(e) in the
sense of treating the tuition plan as a proxy for the original donor to the § 529
plan.97 However, for generation-skipping transfer tax ("GSTT") purposes at
least, the Code already permitted a trust to claim the § 2503(e) exclusion for
transfers made by it to educational institutions.98 In addition, to the extent that
the original donor is the account owner and retains the power to revoke the
beneficiary designation or demand a refund of the account balance, it could
be argued that any payments of plan assets to third parties for education
expenses are in substance a completed transfer at that time by the
donor/account owner. It is much as if that person had written a check directly
92. "In no event shall a contribution to a qualified State tuition program on behalf of a designated
beneficiary be treated as a taxable gift for purposes ofchapter 12." 1996 Act, Pub. L No. 104-188, § 1806,
110 Stat. 1755, 1896 (current version at I.R.C. § 529(c)(2)).
93. See infra Part 11.B.2.a.
94. See infra Part 11.B.2.a.
95. 1996 Act § 1806, 110 Stat. at 1896-97 (current version at I.R.C. § 529(c)(3)(A)).
96. "For purposes of [§] 2503(e), the waiver (or payment to an educational institution) of qualified
higher education expenses of a designated beneficiary under a qualified State tuition program shall be
treated as a qualified transfer." Id., 110 Stat. at 1897 (current version at I.R.C. § 529(c)(5)).
97. Taxpayers who sought to qualify payments to the prepaid tuition fund itself under § 2503(e)
received generally positive responses from the Service with respect to the treatment of the payments made
directly to the prepaid tuition authority. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 88-25-027 (Mar. 29, 1988) (§ 2503(e) did not
apply to shelter the gift to a trust which in turn purchased a prepaid tuition contract); Priv. Ltr. Rul.
89-010-27 (Sept. 30, 1988) (§ 2503(e) did not apply to shelter the gift to a trust which in turn purchased
a prepaid tuition contract); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 91-09-032 (Nov. 30, 1990) (§ 2503(e) applied to payments made
by a trust to the prepaid tuition authority); Tech. Adv. Mem. 1999-41-013 (July 9, 1999) (§ 2503(e) applied
to payments made by a grandparent to the prepaid tuition authority).
98. I.R.C. § 2611(b)(1).
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to the third party from resources outside the § 529 plan, or at the time of
contribution to the § 529 plan, had written a post-dated check.
Third, the value of any interest in a qualified tuition program attributable
to contributions made by an individual to such program was includible in the
gross estate of the contributor for estate tax purposes.99
The gift tax provisions produced a benign result because they did not
require the utilization of the annual gift exclusion at any time or the filing of
a gift tax return.' The postponed "gift" on distribution would be completely
absorbed by the § 2503(e) exclusion. Certainly, this tidy result would have
been disturbed as § 529 evolved to include room and board as qualified higher
education expenses-§ 2503(e) is confined to tuitionl''-but § 2503(e) could
have been amended for this narrow purpose to track the room and board
requirements of § 529.
The estate tax treatment was surely considered to be a negative for
taxpayers, but, of course, only for the relatively few taxpayers for whom the
estate tax matters. It would be no impediment for other contributors. The
estate tax treatment could be faulted for the complexities involved in tracing
the accumulations from contributions by multiple donors to a § 529 plan.
Furthermore, the 1996 Act's solution was flawed from the standpoint of
established principles because the estate tax inclusion apparently could not be
avoided even if the donor relinquished all ownership or other control over the
account. 0 2 The statute simply stated that contributions by a donor were
includible in the donor's estate.0 3 As discussed below, the focus should be
on the person who holds powers over the § 529 plan, usually the account
owner. Like many simple solutions, the 1996 Act in this respect was
overbroad in its potential application.
2. The 1997 Act's Change of Direction
The 1997 Act changed the wealth transfer taxation aspects of the § 529
plan to their current state. In describing the amendments, the staff of the Joint
Committee on Taxation engaged in what might be considered an
99. The 1996 Act broadly stated: "The value of any interest in any qualified State tuition program
which is attributable to contrbutions made by an individual to such program on behalf of any designated
beneficiary shall be includible in the gross estate of the contributor for purposes ofchapter 11." 1996 Act,
Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1806, 110 Stat. 1755, 1897 (current version at I.R.C. § 529(c)(4)).
100. I.R.C. § 6019(1).
101. Id. § 2503(e)(2)(A).




understatement, at best, or disingenuous misinformation, at worst, by
describing the substantial changes as simply "clarifying the estate and gift tax
treatment of contributions to qualified State tuition programs or education
IRAs. ' ' 10 4 Still, if the degree of significance of tax legislation is measured in
part by the budget effects, these amendments did not warrant a separate line
revenue cost projection.'
The Conference Committee for the 1997 Act had to weigh different
approaches to modifying the wealth transfer taxation aspects of § 529 plans.
Both the House bill and the Senate amendment were in agreement that, for
estate tax purposes, the value of any interest in a qualified tuition program or
Coverdell Education Savings Account would be includible in the estate of the
beneficiary and not in the estate of the contributor.0 6 This made little sense
from the standpoint of established wealth transfer taxation principles if the
account owner retained the power to revoke the beneficiary designation or
demand a refund of the plan assets. Despite that, or perhaps because of that,
shifting the imposition of estate taxes to the beneficiary, usually a young adult
with few assets, would generally be a favorable development for taxpayers.
Moreover, the proposal would apply an estate tax to the beneficiary's estate
only if he or she passed away before the account assets were consumed by
education expenses and only if the account assets were paid to the designated
beneficiary's estate."0 7 This proposal would, as a practical matter, eliminate
the estate taxation of § 529 plans in most cases. As discussed below in greater
detail, the final compromise did exempt all persons from estate tax on § 529
plan assets except to the extent of amounts distributed to a designated
beneficiary on account of the beneficiary's death-a 180 degree turn from the
prior law.
The competing proposals differed with respect to the gift taxation
treatment of contributions to § 529 plans. In its bill, the House proposed that
104. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, 105TH CONG., SUMMARY OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF
H.R. 2014 ("TAXPAYER RELIEF ACT OF 1997") 6 (Comm. Print 1997).
105. The estimated budget effects document does not mention the § 529 plan estate and gift tax
changes anywhere. However, the 1997 Act expanded the definition ofqualified higher education expenses
to include room and board and the revenue loss was projected at $1.491 billion for fiscal years 1997-2007.
STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, 105TH CONG., ESTIMATED BUDGET EFFECTS OF THE CONFERENCE
AGREEMENT ON THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF H.R. 2014,THE "TAXPAYER RELIEFACT OF 1997" 1 (Comm.
Print 1997). This "estimate includes interaction with estate and gift taxes." Id.
106. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, 105TH CONG., COMPARISON OF REVENUE PROVISIONS OF
H.R. 2014 AS PASSED BY THE HOUSE AND SENATE 31-33 (Comm. Print 1997) [hereinafter 1997 REVENUE
COMPARISON]; H.R. 2014, 105 th Cong. § 211 (C)(4)(A) (1997) (providing the estate tax treatment of § 529
plans), reprinted in 1997-4 C.B. 347.
107. H.R. 2014, 105th Cong. § 21 l(C)(4), (D) (1997), reprinted in 1997-4 C.B. 347-48.
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contributions be treated as completed gifts of present interests, qualifying the
contributions for the annual gift exclusion.' 8 In its amendment, the Senate
proposed that neither contributions nor distributions would be considered
taxable gifts for federal gift tax purposes.0 9 The Senate approach retained the
no taxable gift approach of the 1996 Act but eliminated the symmetry of the
1996 Act that included plan balances in the donor's estate. As a practical
matter, the Senate amendment essentially eliminated all wealth transfer
taxation of § 529 plans.
The Conference Committee compromise in part followed the House bill
in terms of gift tax consequences, treating the contributions as completed
gifts." 0 The Conference Committee also created a special five year election
that permits the tax-free front loading of contributions for gift tax purposes."'
Notably, both the House bill and the Senate amendment included limits
on amounts contributed to § 529 plans sponsored by private educational
institutions, as well as a prohibition on further contributions once a designated
beneficiary reached age eighteen."2 While these concepts were included in
the Coverdell Education Savings Account provisions, none of them were
adopted in § 529."'
This essay will now examine in depth the current wealth transfer taxation
provisions that were introduced by the 1997 Act.
a. The Deemed Completed Gift
The statute now provides that "any contribution to a qualified tuition
program on behalf of any designated beneficiary shall be treated as a
completed gift to such beneficiary."'' 4 The language overrules long
established doctrine that a gift is rendered incomplete if the donor has the
reserved power to name new beneficiaries, even if the donor cannot revest the
beneficial title to the property in himself or herself."5 This appears to be a
response to the possibility of subsequent changes in the designated beneficiary
108. 1997 REVENUE COMPARISON, supra note 106, at 32-33.
109. Id.
110. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-220, at 25 (1997), reprinted in 1997-4 C.B. 1495.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 355-59, reprinted in 1997-4 C.B. 1824-49 (comparing the House and Senate proposals
for qualified tuition programs).
113. Id.
114. I.R.C. § 529(c)(2)(A)(I).
115. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(c) (as amended in 1999) (adopting the rule announced in
Estate of Sanford v. Comm'r, 308 U.S. 39 (1939)).
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by a contributor/owner of the § 529 plan. This would not be a concern if the
contributor and owner were different persons. The language also identifies
the designated beneficiary, rather than the § 529 plan itself, as the donee." 6
This is analogous to the judicial characterization of trusts as being transparent,
focusing on the beneficiary for gifts in trust.'17
Under established doctrine, a completed gift can occur if the beneficiary
subsequently receives income from the property or other enjoyment, with the
amount of the taxable gift limited to the value of such income or enjoyment." 8
Although that result probably does not follow under current § 529 because the
gift is considered complete upon the contribution to the plan, the statute
nevertheless cautiously confirms that, except for a special rule for shifts in the
generation of the designated beneficiary, "in no event shall a distribution from
a qualified tuition program be treated as a taxable gift."' 9
The statutory language apparently overrules a more fundamental gift
taxation principle: A gift is incomplete if the "donor reserves the power to
revest the beneficial title to the property in himself or herself."' 0 Under this
principle, the gift is considered incomplete unless and until the donor
relinquishes the power or the power otherwise terminates. Absent the deemed
completed gift, this doctrine would apply to a § 529 plan if the same person
was both the contributor and the owner. Nevertheless, the statute deems the
transfer to be a completed gift in all cases.'2 ' This "easy to complete"
approach is meritorious from the standpoint of simplifying matters. A
contributor, whether or not an owner of the account, knows at the outset that
he or she always has made a completed gift. Although some contributors
might wish to postpone the completion of the gift until a later date,
particularly if it were taxable, the statute shelters future appreciation in the
§ 529 plan from later application of the gift tax by accelerating the timing of
the gift.
b. The Future Interest Exemption
The designated beneficiary's enjoyment of the property in the § 529 plan
would commence "in use, possession, or enjoyment at some future date or
116. I.R.C. § 529(c)(2)(A)(I).
117. See, e.g., Comm'r v. Hutchings, 312 U.S. 393, 396 (1941).
118. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(0 (as amended in 1999).
119. I.R.C. § 529(c)(5)(A).
120. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(c) (as amended in 1999).
121. I.R.C. § 529(c)(2)(A)(I).
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time '  and under established principles would otherwise constitute a future
interest in property ineligible for the annual gift exclusion.' 23  However, by
statutory fiat, a contribution on behalf of a designated beneficiary of a § 529
plan is treated as a gift "which is not a future interest in property.' '124  It
consequently qualifies for the annual gift exclusion." 5
As a practical matter, this exemption from the future interest rule ensures
that modest contributions (i.e., currently $11,000 or less) to § 529 plans will
be sheltered by the annual gift exclusion'26 and exempt from gift taxation and
the GSTT. 127  The future interest rule was originally enacted to deal with
remote or contingent trust interests for which the ultimate beneficiaries could
be difficult to identify.' 2' As discussed above, § 529 plans demonstrate
uncertainty as to ultimate beneficiaries, probably to a greater degree than a
long-term multigenerational trust if one considers the power of the account
owner to demand a refund. It is outside the scope of this essay to offer an
analytical defense of the gift tax's future interest rule, arule that has produced
more than its fair share of litigation and formalistic maneuvering, including
the development of the Crummey clause. 29  However, it is fair to say that
122. Treas. Reg. § 25.2503-3(a) (as amended in 1983).
123. The § 529 plan is a contract and the gift tax regulations state that a future interest does not
include "such contractual rights as exist in a bond, note (though bearing no interest until maturity), or in
a policy of life insurance, the obligations of which are to be discharged by payments in the future. But a
future interest or interests in such contractual obligations may be created by the limitations created in a trust
or other instrument of transfer used in effecting a gift." Id. Example six of the regulation finds that the
payment of premiums by L on a policy of insurance on L's life is a gift of a present interest of property if
all the incidents of ownership in the policy are vested inM. Id., Ex. (6). It would seem that a § 529 plan
in which the designated beneficiary's interest is subject to change and divestment is not comparable to the
insurance policy in the example.
124. I.R.C. § 529(c)(2)(A)(I).
125. See id. § 2503(b)(1).
126. Id. The Code requires an inflation adjustment to the $10,000 annual exclusion amount stated
in § 2503(b)(1). I.R.C. § 2503(b)(2). The adjusted amount for gifts made in 2004 is $11,000. Rev. Proc.
2003-85, 2003-49 I.R.B. 1184.
127. Gifts that qualify for the annual gift exclusion are generally granted a correlative exclusion from
the GSTT. See I.R.C. § 2642(c).
128. S. REP. No. 72-665, § 504 (1932), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. 496, 526.
129. The clause takes its name from the influential Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision Crummey
v. Commissioner, 397 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1968), which approved a somewhat hollow, formalistic device to
circumvent the future interest rule. The Service adopted the result in Crummey in Revenue Ruling 73-405,
1973-2 C.B. 321, but that did not foreclose subsequent revenue rulings, private letter rulings, and judicial
decisions to further define the contours of the doctrine. Thousands of pages of commentary have been
devoted to the doctrine. For some of the more recent commentary, see David Pratt & Elaine M. B ucher,
Updated Practical Planning with Crummey Powers, 29 EST. PLAN. 73 (2002); Walter D. Schwidetzky,
Estate Planning: Hyperlexis and the Annual Exclusion Rule, 32 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 211 (1998).
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exempting § 529 plans from the rule is highly inconsistent with longstanding
doctrine and its only redemption is the new "simplicity" for the donor.3
Congress dispensed with the future interest rule on at least one prior
occasion when it enacted the cumbersome provisions of § 2503(c) of the
Code. However, reflecting the origins of the future interest rule, that section
very carefully requires that the identity of the donee be limited to one
individual (barring death), mandates distributions at age 21, and is much more
circumscribed overall than the open-ended approach permitted by § 529.'
Perhaps the future interest rule is an anachronism and should be abolished, but
§ 529 plans, with their open-ended ownership structures, are not the
appropriate vehicle for that reform. 
3 2
c. The Special Five- Year Election
At the election of the donor, annual contributions to a § 529 plan in
excess of the annual gift exclusion may be ratably spread over a five year
period beginning with the calendar year of contribution for purposes of
applying the annual exclusion.' According to the Service instructions for the
gift tax return (Form 709), in the absence of other gifts, the donor need not file
a Form 709 for the following four years."'
The statutory language-"be taken into account for purposes of
[§ 2503(b)]"3'-implies that if the contribution were to exceed the product
of the annual exclusion amount multiplied by five, the application of the
applicable exclusion amount or payment of an actual gift tax would be made
in the year of contribution with respect to the taxable excess. The proposed
130. Even without the § 529 exemptions, more sophisticated taxpayers could create a completed gift
of a present interest by creating an irrevocable trust with a Crummey clause for gifts to the trust under which
an independent trustee would invest in § 529 plan accounts on behalf of the trust. See Crummey, 397 F.2d
at 83, 88; Pratt & Bucher, supra note 129, at 73; Schwidetzky, supra note 129, at 216-22; see also supra
note 91 and accompanying text.
131. I.R.C. § 2503(c).
132. Compare Harry L. Gutman, Reforming Federal Wealth Transfer Taxes After ERTA, 69 VA. L.
REv. 1183, 1245-46 (1983) (suggesting that the future interest exception should not extend to gifts to
trusts), with Jeffrey G. Sherman, 'Tis a Gift to be Simple: The Need for a New Definition of "Future
Interest"for Gift Tax Purposes, 55 U. CIN. L. REv. 585, 666-67 (1987) (arguing that the future interest
test should be satisfied only by gifts satisfying a "fee simple absolute" test).
133. I.R.C. § 529(c)(2)(B).
134. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP'T OF TREASURY, INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 709 5-6 (2003),
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i709.pdf (last visited July 7, 2004) [hereinafter 2003
INSTRUCTIONS 709].
135. I.R.C. § 529(c)(2)(B).
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regulations'36 and Service instructions for Form 709' adopt this
interpretation.
If the donor makes the five year election discussed above, but dies before
the end of the five year period, the contributions allocable to periods after the
date of death of the donor are treated as additions to the donor's gross
estate.'38 Only the amounts of the original contributions are treated as
additions, not their current value.'39 This also is inconsistent with prevailing
estate tax principles that include an asset brought back into the gross estate at
its fair market value on the decedent's date of death'40 (or alternate valuation
date,' 4 ' if applicable).
The five year election is quite generous, permitting the donor to frontload
contributions to the § 529 plan. While it is true that it streamlines the gift tax
reporting for large contributions to § 529 plans, only individuals of some
wealth have the resources available to make gifts of $55,000 to $110,00042
per donee. To the author's knowledge, this type of election has never before
been allowed for wealth transfer taxation purposes and is quite
extraordinary. 43 In other contexts, donors have been left to rely on self-help
spreading measures such as sales of property to the donee with serial
forgiveness of the obligation 44 and retained interest structures.
45
136. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.529-5(b)(2), 63 Fed. Reg. 45,019,45,031 (Aug. 24, 1998).
137. 2003 INSTRUCTIONS 709, supra note 134, at 5-6.
138. I.R.C. § 529(c)(4)(C).
139. Id.
140. I.R.C. § 2031(a).
141. Id. § 2032(a).
142. The annual gift exclusion as of 2004 is $11,000 per donee See supra note 126. With gift
splitting, a married couple could in one yeargift $1 10,000 to an account for a single designated beneficiary.
I.R.C. § 2513(a)(1).
143. Commentators have advanced a number of proposals to refine the annual gift exclusion. See,
e.g., Robert B. Smith, Should We Give Away the Annual Exclusion?, 1 FLA. TAX REv. 361 (1993)
(proposing additional restrictions on the annual exclusion); John G. Steinkamp, Common Sense and the Gift
Tax Annual Exclusion, 72 NEB. L. REv. 106 (1993) (proposing additional restrictions on the annual
exclusion).
144. Compare Estate of Maxwell v. Comm'r, 3 F.3d 591 (2d Cir. 1993) (treating installment sale of
property with serial forgiveness of the purchase money indebtedness as a gift with a retained life estate),
with Haygood v. Comm'r, 42 T.C. 936 (1964) (respecting installment sale of property with serial
forgiveness of the purchase money indebtedness).
145. Assorted strategies can be used to reduce the immediate taxable amount of a gift, but they can
entail recapturing the deduction over future years. For example, grantor retained unitrusts and grantor
retained annuity trusts governed by § 2702 of the Code require payments to the grantor in satis faction of
the retained interest, I.R.C. § 2702(b)(1), (2), and those amounts to some extent replenish the amount of
the donor's taxable estate. However, some techniques governed by § 2702, such as the qualified personal
residence trust, id. § 2702(aX3)(A)(ii), reduce the amount of the gift but do not replenish the donor's
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d. The Shift of Generations Rule
Section 529 imposes some safeguards to prevent contributions in excess
of those necessary to provide for the higher education of a designated
beneficiary. 146 In addition, the imposition of an income tax and a ten percent
penalty on the amounts not used for qualified higher education expenses is an
additional disincentive for overfunding the plan.1 47 On the other hand, the
limitation on accumulations of funds has been interpreted to permit
accumulations as great as $315,270 per designated beneficiary. 4 ' Any excess
funds can be redirected to a new designated beneficiary without penalty,
149
and the statute permits the designation of a broad class of family members.'5°
In fact, from an income tax standpoint, the designation of lineal descendants
as new beneficiaries is unlimited and could include children, their children,
the great-grandchildren, and so forth. 5' Consequently, by rolling forward the
generations as designated beneficiaries, a large family could accumulate
significant § 529 plan assets that could be retained generation to generation
free of the imposition of federal income taxes.
To seemingly discourage large multigenerational accumulations of § 529
plan assets, the statute provides that a change in the designated beneficiary or
rollover to the account of a new beneficiary can require the imposition of a
gift tax if the new beneficiary is a generation below the generation of the old
beneficiary under GSTT principles.' However, the proposed regulations
treat the gift as being made by the old beneficiary.'53 Such treatment is
peculiar from the standpoint of established wealth transfer tax principles,
because the new designation was probably made by the account owner, not by
the old beneficiary. In that regard, the lone example in the proposed
regulations of a taxable change of beneficiary involves a parent as a
donor/account owner who does just that:
taxable estate.
146. I.R.C. § 529(b)(6).
147. Id. § 529(c)(3)(A), (c)(6).
148. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
149. I.R.C. § 529(c)(3)(C)(I).
150. Id. § 529(e)(2).
151. See supra note 35.
152. I.R.C. § 529(c)(5)(B).
153. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.529-5(b)(3)(ii), 63 Fed. Reg. 45,019, 45,032 (Aug. 24, 1998).
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In Year [one], P makes a contribution to a [qualified tuition program] on behalf of P's
child, C. In Year [four], P directs that a distribution from the account for the benefit of
C be made to an account for the benefit of P's grandchild, G. The rollover distribution
is treated as a taxable gift by C to G, because, under [§1 2651, G is assigned to a
generation below the generation assignment of C.'
This would usually be favorable from a wealth transfer taxation
standpoint because the old beneficiary is likely younger and less wealthy than
the donor or account owner. This result, however, is not supported by the
language of the statute or by established wealth transfer taxation principles.
It apparently is based on a supporting statement from the House Report.'55
The statute further provides that a change of beneficiary will also be
subject to the GSTT "if the new beneficiary is a generation below the
generation of the old beneficiary."' 56 That statement is consistent with a view
that the GSTT transferor is the original donor, because the GSTT generally
treats a natural person as a "skip person" only if that person is assigned to a
generation which is two or more generations below the generation assignment
of the transferor.'57 For example, if a grandparent was the contributor to the
§ 529 plan and a grandchild or great-grandchild was the original designated
beneficiary, that could produce a direct skip for GSTT purposes for the
original contribution.'5 8 A designation of a beneficiary even one generation
lower would produce a direct skip. Likewise, if the parent was the contributor
to the § 529 plan and a child was the original beneficiary, the designation of
a new beneficiary one generation lower, a grandchild, would also produce a
direct skip. The one lower generation rule of the statute seems to assume that
the contributor or account owner will always be at least one generation higher
than the original beneficiary. This assumption probably works in most cases,
but not all.'5 9
154. Id. § 1.529-5(b)(3)(iii), 63 Fed. Reg. at 45,032.
155. "In all other cases, a transfer from one beneficiary to another beneficiary (or a change in the
designated beneficiary) will be treated as ataxable gift from the old beneficiary to the newbeneficiary .. "
H.R. REP. No. 105-148, at 328 (1997), reprinted in 1997-4 C.B. 319, 650. In fairness, because the statute
treats the original contributions as a completed gift and ignores the powers of the account owner for estate
tax purposes, the designated beneficiary is in some respects the only person without an express statutory
immunity. I.R.C. § 529(c)(2)(A).
156. I.R.C. § 529(c)(5)(B).
157. Id. § 2613(a)(1).
158. However, to the extent the contribution qualifies for the annual gift exclusion, it will also be
exempt from the GSTI'. See I.R.C. § 2642(c).
159. Of course, if the contributor names himself or herself as the original designated beneficiary, the
wheels fall off the statute. Furthermore, at least one article suggests strategies such as adult attorneys
establishing § 529 plans for themselves, so this is not that farfetched. See Helen W. Gurmarsson, Law
Pulse, 90 ILL. B.J. 168, 174 (2002).
[Vol. 2:1
QUALIFIED TUITION PROGRAMS
The proposed regulations attempt to rescue the statute from the
interpretative mess created by its own language by stating that the GSTT will
apply only "if the new beneficiary is assigned to a generation which is two or
more levels lower than the generation assignment of the old beneficiary." 6
Of course, this clearly contradicts the language of the statute. But it is
consistent with the gift rule discussed above that focuses on the original
beneficiary as the donor, and consequently also as the GSTT transferor.
If a gift or generation-skipping transfer is produced by the change of a
designated beneficiary, it is unclear from the statute if it qualifies for the
annual gift exclusion. 6' However, the proposed regulation provides that if
there is a taxable transfer, the five year averaging rule may be applied.'62 This
draws support from a statement in the House Conference Committee Report
that a taxable gift would be produced only if it exceeded the annual gift
exclusion'63 and from a statement expressly approving use of the five year
averaging rule in this instance.'64
These rules do offer planning options, as discussed previously. First, if
a gift or GSTT transfer arises, it is considered to be made by the original
beneficiary, who is more likely less wealthy at the time, has no other
outstanding gifts, and so forth.'65 Second, the original beneficiary can use the
annual gift exclusion, plus the five year averaging rule.'66 Third, if the gift
transfer is exempt by reason of the annual gift exclusion, it will be also an
exempt transfer for GSTT purposes.'67 Fourth, the proposed regulations focus
on the original beneficiary as the transferor for GSTT purposes, so if the
original beneficiary were a grandchild, the plan remains GSTT exempt
through the level of great-great grandchildren. 6 ' As with most GSTT
transfers that are exempt from tax, the strategy is to name the youngest
160. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.529-5(b)(3)(ii), 63 Fed. Reg. 45,019, 45,032 (Aug. 24, 1998).
161. The deemed completed gift rule and present interest rule apply to "any contribution to a qualified
tuition program on behalf of any designated beneficiary." I.R.C. § 529(c)(2)(A).
162. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.529-5(b)(3)(ii), 63 Fed. Reg. 45,019, 45,032 (Aug. 24, 1998).
163. "Thus, a transfer of an account from a brother to his sister will not be treated as a taxable gift,
whereas a transfer from a father to his son will be treated as a taxable gift (to the extent it exceeds the
$1 0,000present-lawgift tax exclusion)." H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-220, at 356 (1997), reprinted in 1997-4
C.B. 1835.
164. "If a beneficiary's interest is rolled over to a beneficiary in a lower generation (e.g., parent to
child or uncle to niece), the five-year averaging rule described above may be applied to exempt up to
$50,000 of the transfer from gift tax." Id. at 365, reprinted in 1997-4 C.B. 1835.
165. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.529-5(b)(3)(ii), 63 Fed. Reg. 45,019, 45,032 (Aug. 24, 1998).
166. See I.R.C. § 529(c)(5)(B).
167. See I.R.C. § 2642(c).
168. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.529-5(b)(3)(ii), 63 Fed. Reg. 45,019, 45,032 (Aug. 24, 1998).
2004]
PITTSBURGH TAX REVIEW
designated beneficiary possible at the outset. Fifth, even if a gift tax or GSTT
is produced by a designation of beneficiary, an income tax will not be due if
the new designated beneficiary qualifies as a family member.'69
The shift of generations rule seems to have few teeth. Furthermore, some
commentators have observed that the account owner's power to shift
designated beneficiaries of the same generation without the imposition of gift
tax or GSTT could lead to other abuses. 7° For example, an account owner
could contribute funds to plans initially established for different beneficiaries
of the same generation, such as her daughter, a niece, and a nephew.," Later
the account owner could change the designated beneficiary of the latter two
accounts to be her daughter, all ostensibly without the imposition of wealth
transfer taxes.'72
e. The Broad Estate Tax Exemption
Subject to two exceptions, § 529 offers a broad exemption from estate
taxation, stating that "no amount shall be includible in the gross estate of any
individual for purposes of [the estate tax] by reason of an interest in a
qualified tuition program.""' One exception to this rule was previously
discussed, and deals with the recapture of gifts for which the five year election
was made and the donor did not survive for five years.'74 The other exception
provides that the exemption "shall not apply to amounts distributed on account
of the death of a beneficiary.""'
If the contributor and the owner are the same person, the astonishing
breadth of the exemption begins to emerge. For example, if the plan permits
169. See I.R.C. § 529(c)(3)(C)(I), (e)(2).
170. See Merrick, supra note 9, at 319-20. The courts have generally rejected schemes to multiply
the annual exclusion amount through transitory gifts to third parties. See, e.g., Schultz v. United States,
493 F.2d 1225 (4th Cir. 1974); Heyen v. United States, 945 F.2d 359 (10th Cir. 1991). However, those
arrangements generally require the cooperation of the third party as § 529 plans do not and could support
the claim of a simple change of heart on the part of the donor.
171. See Merrick, supra note 9, at 320.
172. Id.
173. I.R.C. § 529(c)(4)(A).
174. See supra text accompanying notes 138-41.
175. I.R.C. § 529(c)(4)(B). The operative language is prefaced with the subtitle "amounts includible
in estate of designated beneficiary in certain cases," which suggests that the drafters envisioned the
treatment of payments received by the estate of a designated beneficiary who passes away. However,
notwithstanding that prefatory language, the operative language is arguably broad enough to insure that if
the owner of the account receives a distribution of the plan assets by reason of the death of the designated




the contributor/owner to distribute the plan assets to himself or herself,
shutting out the designated beneficiary, that would give rise to inclusion under
several provisions of the estate tax. For example, § 2038 of the Code imposes
an estate tax on interests for which the donor has retained the power to "alter,
amend, revoke, or terminate."'76 An account owner's power to revoke the
§ 529 plan account and demand a refund would surely satisfy this requirement.
Moreover, aside from permitting distributions of plan assets to the
contributor/owner himself or herself,'77 the power to change the designated
beneficiary would probably constitute a power to "alter, amend, revoke, or
terminate" the interest under § 2038, as well as the power "to designate the
persons who shall possess or enjoy the property or the income therefrom"'78
for § 2036. This type of retained power to determine who may enjoy the
property has an inherently testamentary character, a character that traditionally
would invoke application of the estate tax.
If the contributor is not the same person as the owner, the contributor
generally would have no continuing estate tax concerns.'79 Grandparents
contributing funds for the education of their grandchildren could fall into this
group if another person serves as the account owner, including a custodian or
trustee.8 ° However, if the transfer satisfies a legal obligation of support,
established doctrine might produce a taxable inclusion of the plan assets in the
contributor's estate by application of § 2036(a)(1) of the Code as retained
"possession or enjoyment of, or the right to the income from, the property."''
176. I.R.C. § 2038(a)(1).
177. A perennial topic for federal wealth transfer taxation has been reforming the doctrine of
completeness of gifts, such that a taxpayer could make a transfer subject to either the gift tax or the estate
tax, but not both. The proposals commonly espouse "easy-to-complete" versus "hard-to-complete" rules.
See, e.g., Joseph M. Dodge, Redoing the Estate and Gift Taxes Along Easy-to- Value Lines, 43 TAX L. REV.
241 (1998); Harry L. Gutman, A Comment on the ABA Tax Section Task Force Report on Transfer Tax
Restructuring, 41 TAX LAW. 653 (1988); James M. Spica, Federal Transfer Tax Treatment of Actuarial
Appreciation, 42 DRAKE L. REV. 123 (1993). However, even under most proposals in this regard, a power
that can be exercised in the favor of the transferor, such as the refund feature of § 529 plans, would still
render the gift incomplete and subject to estate tax.
178. I.R.C. § 2036(a)(2).
179. See supra Part III.A.
180. See supra Part lIlA.
181. I.R.C. § 2036(a)(1). The regulations confirm that retained use, possession, right tothe income,
or other enjoyment of the transferred property can arise to the extent the property "is to be applied toward
the discharge ofa legal obligation of the decedent, or otherwise for his pecuniary benefit. The tern 'legal
obligation' includes a legal obligation to support a dependent during the decedent's lifetime." Treas. Reg.
§ 20.2036-l(b)(2)(as amended in 1960). In a majority of states, higher education expenses are not an item
of support, but in approximately eighteen states plus the District of Columbia, they can be accounted for
at the dissolution of marriage. See Carol R. Goforth, The Case for Expanding Child Support Obligations
to Cover Post-Secondary Educational Expenses, 56 ARK. L. REv. 93, 100-01 nn.39-40 (2003).
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If the owner is not the contributor, but wields broad powers over the plan,
including the power to distribute the assets to himself or herself, the owner
should be considered to possess a general power of appointment, and the
appointable assets would be included in the owner's gross estate by § 2041 of
the Code. If the owner is subject to the imposition of a trust on the proceeds
of the plan,'8 2 the power may constitute only a nontaxable "special" power of
appointment."i 3
All of this discusses what would have been the estate tax result but for the
application of the § 529 exemption. It appears that the § 529 estate tax
exemption answers all of these questions simply and conclusively, producing
estate tax inclusion only on account of the two narrow statutory exceptions
discussed at the beginning of this section.
IV. ASSESSING § 529's FAVORED STATUS
This part of the essay is an attempt to explain and, if possible, reconcile
the special status of § 529 plans that is so inconsistent with established wealth
transfer taxation principles.
A. Incremental Repeal of the Wealth Transfer Taxes or Simply Another
Loophole?
It might be claimed that the wealth transfer taxation aspects of § 529 were
simply an incrementalist, partial repeal of the wealth transfer taxes by a
Congress and Presidential administration that were generally antagonistic
toward "death taxes." In that respect, the 2001 Act provided for the temporary
repeal of the estate tax and GSTT,5 4 and it clearly was the work of such a
Congress and President. However, as discussed below, the forces that shaped
§ 529 are less clear cut. Nevertheless, at the outset one must assume that the
wealth transfer taxation system merits concern about its internal coherence.
182. See supra Part ILI.A for a discussion of constructive trust doctrine, custodianships, and express
trusts.
183. The exercise of a so called "special" power of appointment which cannot be exercised for the
benefit of the holder, the holder's creditors, or the holder's estate, is not treated as a gift or included in the
holder's estate. L.R1C. §§ 2514, 2041.
184. 2001 Act, Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 501, 115 Stat. 38, 69-70 (codified at .LC. §§ 2210, 2664)
(providing for termination of the estate tax and the GSTT, respectively, for years after 2009). However,
section 901 of the 2001 Act provides that its provisions, including the terminations, shall not apply after
2010. Id. § 901(a), 115 Stat. at 150. The gift tax is retained primarily as a backstop for income tax
avoidance and also to anticipate the revival of the other taxes for years after 2010.
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If the wealth transfer taxation system will or should be eliminated altogether,
then why the fuss about polishing the rough edges of legislation such as
§ 529?
It is beyond the scope of this essay to address the merits of a repeal or
substantial revision of the wealth transfer taxation system." 5 For this
discussion, it is assumed that the current system will be retained, and therefore
the role of § 529 in that overall scheme remains the principal issue.
Nevertheless, even if the estate tax and GSTT were abolished, the gift tax
would almost certainly be retained, so many of these issues would remain
relevant even then.
Section 529 was introduced as part of the 1996 Act enacted on August 20,
1996 near the end of President Bill Clinton's first term and during his bid for
re-election.' 16 During the November 1994 elections, the Republican Party had
gained majorities in both the House of Representatives and the Senate,
contributing to a high degree of partisan bickering, stalemate, and vetoes over
budgetary matters and implementation of the tax cuts that were the focus of
the House Republicans' "Contract with America."'' 7 The resulting 1996 Act
was a mixed bag for both political parties, balancing an increase in the
minimum wage as a centerpiece for the Democrats and President Clinton, with
a broad assortment of tax relief such as liberalized home office deduction and
retirement plan rules, expensing of business property, and S corporation
rules. 8 Section 529 was not included in the House Bill and it was introduced
in the Senate amendments.'89 It probably was not seen as a significant part of
the 1996 Act.' 90
185. There is no dearth ofcommentary on the abolition, replacement, or strengthening of the wealth
transfer tax system. See, e.g., Mark L. Ascher, Curtailing Inheritance, 89 MICH. L. REV. 69 (1990); Joel
C. Dobris, A Brieffor the Abolition ofAll Transfer Taxes, 35 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1215 (1984); Joseph M.
Dodge, Beyond Estate and Gift Tax Reform: Including Gifts and Bequests in Income, 91 HARV. L. REV.
1177 (1978); Michael J. Graetz, To Praise the Estate Tax, Not to Bury It, 93 YALE L.J. 259 (1983); Edward
C. Halbach, Jr., An Accessions Tax, 23 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 211 (1988); Edward J. McCaffery,
Being the Best We Can Be (A Reply to My Critics), 51 TAx L. REV. 615 (1996); Edward J. McCaffery, The
Uneasy Case for Wealth Transfer Taxation, 104 YALE L.J. 283 (1994).
186. See Brian McGrory, President's Party Basks AsHe Signs Wage Bill, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 21,
1996, at A18, available at 1996 WL 6874102 (suggesting that signing the bill was important to the
President's perceived ability in an election year to get things done).
187. SHELDON D. POLLACK, THE FAILURE OF U.S. TAX POLICY 133-50 (1996).
188. See generally 1996 Act, Pub. L. No. 104-188, 110 Stat. 1755 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of the Code).
189. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, 105TH CONG., COMPARISON OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS
OF H.R. 3448 (SMALL BUSINESS JOB PROTECTION ACT OF 1996) As PASSED BY THE HOUSE AND THE SENATE
80-82 (Comm. Print 1996).
190. President Clinton's statement issued with respect to the 1996 Act did not mention § 529 plans.
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The inconsistent wealth transfer taxation rules were enacted later withthe
1997 Act amendments. 19' The 1997 Act was, by most accounts, another
compromise between Congress and President Clinton,' 92 and the wealth
transfer taxation changes could have again been considered an immaterial
detail in the context of the overall legislative package.
Much of this essay has been spent in explaining § 529's dramatic
departure from longstanding principles of wealth transfer taxation. It is clear,
of course, that this is within the power of Congress. However, the legitimacy
of the overall wealth transfer taxation system could be called into question if
fundamental principles can be so readily discarded. At least from the
standpoint of taxpayers and their advisors, one would usually place some
value on the predictability, and protection of reliance interests, that follow
from continuity and adherence to custom.!' However, that may not be a
forceful objection in this situation because § 529 is an almost unqualified pro-
taxpayer provision, without much of a hint of an adverse result. In addition,
§ 529 plans are a new creation, so taxpayers and their advisors will necessarily
need to learn about their tax consequences as a matter of first impression; the
new statute does not uproot an existing provision dealing with the same area.
Even if § 529 lacks coherence with many wealth transfer taxation
principles, an immediate response is: "So what?" Although there is some
fundamental logic to the Code, much of the detail is a hodgepodge of layers
of inconsistent compromises. Nevertheless, an unprincipled piece of
legislation may be seen to lack integrity'94 in carving out its special
See Statement by President Clinton on the Job Protection Act, U.S. NEWS WIRE, Aug. 20, 1996, available
at 1996 WL 5623434.
191. While the wealth transfer tax exemptions were set firmly in place with the 1997 Act
amendments, the section still provided only for the deferral of income taxes as the account accumulated.
See supra Part II.A (discussing the history of the income tax treatment of § 529 plans). The 2001 Act
expanded the benefits of § 529 by introducing the income tax exemption for distributions used for qualified
higher education expenses. 2001 Act, Pub. L No. 107-16, § 402(b), 115 Slat. 38, 61-62.
192. See Ann McFeatters, Clinton, GOP Call a Truce for Tax Cuts, PATRIOT LEDGER (Boston),
Aug. 6, 1997, at 4, available at 1997 WL 8187715 ("The new laws were hammered out of the granite of
partisan rancor that turned into a desperate need to show voters that Congress and the White House could
get something done."); Marsha Mercer, Clinton Lauds Bipartisanship Behind Budget; He Signs Bills That
Will Cut Taxes for Many, RICHMOND TIMEs-DISPATCH, Aug. 6, 1997, at A2, available at 1997 WL
7625738 ("Clinton lauded the bipartisanship that led to the first balanced budget in nearly 30 years: 'The
sun is rising on American again.'... Like Reagan, Clinton embraced atax cut, but, unlike Reagan, Clinton
also held out for increases in spending on education, health care and welfare benefits.").
193. In statutory interpretation, for example, some would apply a presumption of interpretation
favoring continuity over change in legal obligations to protect reliance interests. E.g., WILLIAM N.
ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 137-40 (1994).
194. Ronald Dworkin makes much of integrity in legislation, aiming to create laws that are morally
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dispensations. If§ 529 is seen as an unsupportable loophole, inconsistent with
the rest of wealth transfer taxation principles, that perception arguably could
be corrosive to the overall respect for, and compliance with, the wealth
transfer tax system. Certainly, a wealth transfer taxation "purist"'95 might be
offended by the unprincipled assault on the structure of the wealth transfer
taxes. While taxpayers and their advisors may have reduced respect for the
wealth transfer tax laws, albeit an already porous system,'96 it is probably
quite a leap to assert that any substantive problem, such as a reduction in
compliance with the system, is a consequence of Congress' actions in this
regard.
All of this brings us full circle to where this section began: the question
whether § 529 is just another example of Congress not taking wealth transfer
taxation seriously. It could be just that or, as discussed below, § 529's
approach might be justified.
B. The Special Status of Education Incentives
If § 529 reflects a policy of encouraging incentives for education, is the
special status of § 529 justified on that basis, and on such a scale? In that
respect, the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981... singled out education
expenses for special treatment for wealth transfer taxation purposes. That act
introduced § 2503(e) of the Code,'98 which permits unlimited gifts of tuition
coherent. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 176-84, 190-92 (1986).
195. The purist would most likely be a person without a direct stake in the discussion, such as a law
professor.
196. Although limits (such as the enactment of §§ 2701-2704 of the Code in connection with
corporate and partnership valuation freezes) have been placed on some ofthe particular gimmicks identified
by Professor Cooper, the wealth transfer taxes are probably no more comprehensive than when he published
his famous article referring to the system as a de facto "voluntary tax." See generally George Cooper, A
Voluntary Tax? New Perspectives on Sophisticated Estate TaxAvoidance, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 161, passim
(1977).
197. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of the Code).
198. Id. § 441 (b), 95 Stat. at 319. Section 2503(e) in part states:
Any qualified transfer shall not be treated as a transfer of pmperty by gift fbr purposes of this
chapter .... For purposes of this subsection, the term "qualified transfer" means any amount paid
on behalf of an individual ...as tuition to an educational organization described in [§]
170(b)(l)(A)(ii) for the education or training of such individual, or. . . to any person who provides
medical care (as defined in [§] 213(d)) with respect to such individual as payment for such medical
care.
Section 529 acknowledges the kindred nature of §§ 529 and 2503(e) by epressly providing that a




and fees, free of gift taxes, and the GSTT. 99 A gift tax return is not required
to claim the exclusion.200
From a gift tax standpoint, the § 2503(e) exclusion may be appropriate
because the transfer is for immediate consumption by the donee, and there is
not a direct opportunity for an accumulation of wealth by the donee.2 1' In
1969, the American Law Institute proposed such a gift tax exclusion reflecting
the "transfer-for-consumption" idea.2 2  This concept prompted other
proposals to expand the annual gift tax exclusion for other transfers beyond
the limited scope of § 2503(e).0 3 The wealth transfer taxation of § 529 plans
is consistent with this concept if the funds are all consumed for education
expenses. If the funds are consumed for other purposes, or refunded to the
donor/account owner, the concept does not apply. In that respect, the 1996
Act's version of§ 529 had it right-treat the original contribution to the § 529
plan as a nontaxable event and wait and see how the funds are applied.20 4 If
the funds are applied for qualified higher education expenses, then no taxable
gift is created.20 5
Even assuming that § 2503(e) is an appropriate exemption, it is very
circumscribed. The payments must be made directly to the educational
institution, and it covers only tuition and fees, not room and board.20 6 Section
529 in comparison also permits distributions for living expenses.20 7 Because
of the § 2503(e) requirement that payments be made directly to the
educational institution, there is no possibility of the beneficiary using the
payments for other purposes, or for the donor reclaiming the transferred
amounts. Section 529 in comparison permits contributions to the plan far in
199. The GSTT exemption is implemented by § 2642(c) of the Code, which dictates a zero tax for
direct skips that qualify as nontaxable gifts due to § 2503(b) or (e). Furthermore, § 261 l(b)(1) exempts
from the GSTT, transfers which, if made inter vivos by an individual, would not be treated as a taxable gift
by reason of§ 2503(e). This exemption would encompass transfers such as a bequest by an estate, as well
as distributions for education epenses by atrust, if the manner of payment would have otherwise qualified
under § 2503(e).
200. I.R.C. § 6019.
201. Of course, if the donee can preserve other resources that would have been used to pay the
education expenses or avoids borrowing to meet the education expenses, the donee is indeed better off, even
if one ascribes no value to the education purchased With the gifts.
202. Am. LAW INST., FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 19-21 (1969); see also Milton L. Ray,
The Transfer-for-Consumption Problem: Support and the Gift Tax, 59 OR. L. REV. 425 (1981).
203. E.g., Dodge, supra note 177, at 343-44.
204. 1996 Act, Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1806, 110 Stat. 1755, 1895-96 (current version at IR.C.
§ 529(c)(1), (3)(A)).
205. Id.
206. Treas. Reg. § 25.2503-6(b)(2), (c), ex. (4) (as amended in 1984).
207. I.R.C. § 529(e)(3)(B).
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advance of when the designated beneficiary will actually attend the institution
of higher learning. Because of the ease with which new beneficiaries can be
designated if they are members of the broad class of"family" as defined in the
statute," 8 remaining funds in the plan can be diverted to new designated
beneficiaries who were unborn at the time of the original gift. In addition,
§ 529 plans can permit the donor/owner to reclaim the funds as a refund.
Nevertheless, if the § 529 plan funds are ultimately applied toward education
costs, the transfer for consumption principle underlying § 2503(e) would
arguably apply with some force.
The § 2503(e) exclusion is not an estate tax exclusion. 09 In comparison,
§ 529 also offers an estate tax exclusion." ' It is not a convincing argument
that the estate tax exemption is necessary to implement the overall education
tax incentives of § 529 by complementing the income tax exemption for plan
earnings. The Roth IRA, for example, was created as an incentive for
retirement savings, and it, like the § 529 plan, offers an income tax
exemption."' However, the unexpended proceeds of a Roth IRA are included
in the decedent's estate for estate tax purposes. 212 Likewise, the proposed
RSAs and LSAs are also included in a decedent's gross estate.21 3 One could
argue that the Roth IRA is fundamentally different, however, because upon
death the account owner has no further need for the retirement funds.21 4 In
comparison, it would usually be the case that the designated beneficiary who
survives the deceased § 529 plan account owner would have further need for
the § 529 plan funds. The deceased § 529 account owner nevertheless had
access to the funds. Like the owner of a Roth IRA, he or she could have
tapped the § 529 plan funds if necessary during his or her lifetime. The
§ 2503(e) analogy in that respect is not compelling because § 2503(e) deals
with completed gifts to a third party for the benefit of a student. The estate
208. Id. § 529(c)(3)(C), (e)(2).
209. "The proposal as to transfers for consumption is applicable only to lifetime transfers. The
considerations behind the proposal do not carry over significantly to deathtime dispositions. This, of
course, is also true of the annual per-donee exclusion which is not available with respect to deathtime
transfers." AM. LAW INST., supra note 202, at 20. Some of the special lifetime considerations include
limiting taxpayer recordkeeping and filing burdens, consistencywith normal taxpayer expectations of what
should be a taxable gift, and avoiding close questions of what constitutes regular support.
210. L.R.C. § 529(c)(4).
211. Id. § 408A(d).
212. Seeid. § 2039.
213. See Office of Public Affairs, supra note 65.
214. This argument is still valid if the account holder is married, because the estate tax marital




tax, in comparison, is concerned with powers over property that the decedent
retains at death, which is a separate issue. It is not inconsistent or
inappropriate to impose an estate tax on § 529 plans in this situation.
C. Simplicity
It is a basic tax policy tenet that, all other factors being equal, a simple tax
system is preferable to a more complex one. This obvious, common sense
notion is supported by benefits of improved enforcement and compliance and
reduced transaction costs.215
With the applicable exclusion amount currently $1,500,000 and set to
increase to $3,500,000 by 2009,216 the wealth transfer taxes will increasingly
be a concern only to people of more than moderate wealth. This might
suggest that there is no need to focus on the details and the creation of
exemptions, inasmuch as most Americans would never be subject to wealth
transfer taxes, irrespective of whether § 529 assets are included in their gross
estates. A § 529 structured along the lines of established wealth transfer tax
principles that is more inclusive from a wealth transfer tax perspective would
consequently apply to everyone, but might only have effects on wealthier
taxpayers, implementing the broader goals of the wealth transfer tax.
Still, this end result approach to the § 529 exemption could be
undesirable. Unless the gift tax return filing obligation is fundamentally
changed, even individuals of modest wealth would be potentially snared by a
system in which § 529 were more inclusive. Consistent with the primary
justification for the annual gift exclusion as a de minimis amount for routine
gifts, § 529 contributions should be subject to minimal gift tax reporting to
avoid making individuals of modest wealth subject to unnecessary transaction
costs or become non-filers." 7 Aside from the gift tax return filing obligations,
a less liberal § 529 wealth transfer tax posture could discourage even persons
215. Professor Casner, as the Reporter to the American Law Institute study of wealth transfer tax
reform, identified seven goals to guide the study. One goal was "to have a tax system that is readily
understandable in the normal and routine transfer situations." AM. LAW INST., supra note 202, at 78.
David Bradford argues that "[b]y undermining popular support, complexity erodes the self-assessment on
which economical compliance depends." DAVID F. BRADFORD, UNTANGLING THE INCOMETAX 266(1986).
He divides complexity into three types: compliance complexity (required records and forms), transactional
complexity (taxpayer planning responses), and rule complexity (interpreting the law). Id. at 266-67.
216. I.R.C. § 2010(c).
217. Under a more robust wealth transfer tax treatment of § 529 accounts, the estate tax return would
not be a concern for individuals of moderate wealth because a return does not need to be filed if the gross
estate, plus adjusted taxable gifts, does not exceed the applicable exclusion amount. Id. § 6018(a).
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of modest wealth from financial planning for the education of family members
by creating a perception of an overly complex system in which one does not
want to become entangled. That would defeat the legislation's goal of
encouraging saving for higher education, particularly for individuals of
modest wealth. These competing tensions are considered in Part V, where this
essay proposes some amendments to § 529.
D. Incentives, Subsidies, and Loopholes
It can be unpopular to criticize tax provisions that reduce taxpayers'
burdens, particularly for something as fundamental and costly as higher
education. However, if a progressive income tax rate structure remains an
accepted feature of the income tax system,2 ' it would seem that the subsidy
for higher education expenses should be limited on the basis of income. This
would reinforce the progressivity of the income tax structure. It would also
direct the subsidy to those taxpayers who might not be able to attend college
but for the subsidy, rather than directing the subsidy to taxpayers who would
attend college in any event. As demonstrated earlier, other income tax
subsidies for education such as the Hope Scholarship Credit," 9 Lifetime
Learning Credit,22 ° deduction for tuition and fees,22 and Coverdell Education
Savings Account2 2 all contain phase-outs of contributions tied to income.223
The § 529 plan contains no such limits.
218. The current income tax structure is indeed progressive if measured by the progression of the
income tax rate structure, which currently ranges from 10% to 35%. Id. § 1. The effective rate of tax, after
taking into account exclusions, deductions, exemptions, credits, phase-outs of certain items, and so forth,
will not necessarily reflect the progression of that rate structure-the effective rates of tax are probably
flatter. Still, although the degree of progressivity may be in question, it is probably a fair statement that the
overall structure is progressive to some degree. This essay assumes that maintaining the progressive
structure that has survived almost a century of legislative pushes, pulls, and adjustments of the Code is a
valid objective in assessing the income tax system. It is beyond the scope of this essay to otherwise join
the debate on the meaits of a progressive income tax structure. E.g., Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith,
Social Welfare and the Rate Structure: A New Look at Progressive Taxation, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1905
(1987); Walter J. Blum& Harry Kalven, Jr., The Uneasy Casefor Progressive Taxation, 19 U. CHI L. REV.
417 (1952); Donna M. Byrne Progressive Taxation Revisited, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 739 (1995); Marjorie E.
Kornhauser, The Rhetoric of the Anti-Progressive Income Tax Movement: A Typical Male Reaction, 86
MICH. L. REv. 465 (1987).
219. I.R.C. § 25A(b).
220. Id. § 25A(c).
221. Id. § 222.
222. Id. § 530.
223. Id. § 408A(c)(3) (Roth IRA limits on the contributor's income); id. § 530(c)(1) (Coverdell
Education Savings Account limits on the contributor's income).
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With the potent income tax benefit of tax-exempt savings, one might
expect limits on the amount of contributions. That is the case with the
Coverdell Education Savings Account and the Roth IRA. The § 529 plan
contains a vague limit to avoid overfunding accounts,224 but, as discussed
earlier, that has been interpreted as permitting accumulations as great as
$315,270 per designated beneficiary.225
Although the income tax exemption apparently drives the interest in the
§ 529 plan, the wealth transfer taxation aspects can be significant for wealthier
individuals. Furthermore, the benefits of § 529 plans increase with the
marginal income tax rate of the contributor or account owner, and the
attractiveness of§ 529 plans is reportedly greatest for wealthier taxpayers who
do not rely on the subsidy in order to attend college.226 A recurring criticism
of the increase in contribution limits for IRAs and retirement plans asserts that
few taxpayers have enough disposable wealth to fully take advantage of the
expanded contribution limits.227 Accordingly, wealthier taxpayers are the
primary beneficiaries of such legislation.228 That might become the case with
§ 529 plans as well, especially considering that § 529 plans are a welcome
vehicle to which taxable accounts can be shifted to avoid the imposition of
income taxes as well as estate taxes.22 9 As discussed earlier in this essay, if
the limits of the Roth IRA are eliminated with the enactment of RSAs and
224. Id. § 529(b)(6).
225. See The Internet Guide to Funding College: Maximum Contributions, supra note 58.
226. E.g., Merrick, supra note 9, at 316 ("The resulting states' plans are designed primarily with
wealthy investors in mind."); Thomas, supra note 9 ("Robert J. Kuehl, a certified financial planner ... says
he is 'neutral on § 529 plans except in specific cases. I don't think for the average client they are the most
practical or prudent approach. They are best for high net worth individuals."'). A bar journal article even
suggests that a highly compensated individual, such as a partner in a major law firm, could open a § 529
plan account to provide for education, including living expenses, during a career change. Gunnarsson,
supra note 159, at 174. The cost of the tax subsidy produced by the income tax exemption for qualified
tuition program earnings will increase with invested assets. Recent estimates quantify that subsidy as $0.5
billion for 2004, rising to $0.9 billion by 2008. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, 108TH CONG.,
ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX ExPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2004-2008, at 25 (Comm. Print 2003).
227. E.g., Richard L. Kaplan, Economic Inequality andthe Role of Law, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1987,
1997 (2003).
228. Id.
229. E.g., News and Views: Prepaid College Tuition Plans; A GovernmentBountyforMiddle-Class
Whites, J. BLACKS HIGHER EDUC. 41 (Winter 1996), available at 1996 WL 15734544 ("Enrollment data
for the states that presently operate these prepayment plans demonstrate that the plans primarily benefit
middle- and upper-income families."); see also Michael A. Olivas, State College Savings and Prepaid
Tuition Plans: A Reappraisal and Review, 32 J.L. & EDuC. 475, 501 (2003) (suggesting that the benefits
of § 529 plans may be skewed toward upper-middle class and wealthy families). A recent study of § 529
plan ownership could not determine whether § 529 plan investments are "new dollars saved or dollars
shifted from other investments." Dynarski, supra note 16, at 365 n. 10.
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LSAs, those new savings vehicles could divert many, if not most, potential
§ 529 contributors from making such contributions to instead making
contributions to RSAs and LSAs. The result would be to further channel only
wealthy taxpayers into § 529 plans.23" For the wealthy, the extraordinary
exceptions from wealth transfer taxation created by the § 529 plan are simply
too broad if Congress is interested in preserving the integrity of wealth
transfer taxes.
V. FixING § 529
A. Revisiting the 1996 Act
The 1996 Act's version of § 529, although flawed, came close to
balancing simplicity and incentives for saving with preserving the coherence
of the wealth transfer tax system. As discussed above in Part I1l, contributions
to the plan were treated as a nontaxable incomplete gift."' Accordingly, no
gift tax return would need to be filed by anyone.232 Distributions from the
plan that were used for qualified higher education expenses were not treated
as gifts.233 That is consistent with the "transfer-for-consumption" doctrine
discussed in Part IV. Still, the broad incomplete gift rule of the 1996 Act was
not consistent with established principles if the contributor retained no
continuing control over the § 529 plan.
The estate tax treatment of the 1996 Act was also imperfect, as it included
the value of the account in the contributor's gross estate rather than in the
estate of the account owner who typically enjoyed power over the account.234
230. See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
231. "In no event shall a contribution to a qualified State tuition program on behalf of a designated
beneficiary be treated as ataxable giftfor purposes of chapter 12." 1996 Act, Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1806,
110 Stat. 1755, 1896 (current version at I.R.C. § 529(c)(2)).
232. I.R.C. § 6019(1).
233. The 1996 Act treated a distribution as a gift at that time, but if the distribution was made directly
to the educational institution, it was treated as a qualified transfer under I.R.C. § 2503(e), ultimately
producing no taxable gift. See supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
234. "The value of any interest in any qualified State tuition program which is attributable to
contributions made by an individual to such program on behalf of any designated beneficiary shall be
includible in the gross estate of the contributor for purposes ofchapter 11." 1996 Act § 1806, 110 Stat. at
1897 (current version at I.R.C. § 529(c)(4)).
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B. Improving the 1996 Act
1. Wealth Transfer Tax Modifications
The 1996 Act's treatment of § 529 plan contributions as incomplete gifts
was generally consistent with established wealth transfer tax principles.
However, the 1996 Act was not consistent with wealth transfer tax doctrine
in deeming all contributions to be incomplete gifts. A donor who is not also
the account owner, such as a grandparent making contributions on behalf of
a grandchild, should be treated as making a completed gift to the account
owner. Because there is no question as to the identity of the donee, the statute
should provide that the gift is treated as a present interest eligible for the
annual exclusion."' This is consistent with the 1997 Act's treatment of
gifts.236 Although this introduces some complexity into the scheme, if the
annual contributions do not exceed the annual gift exclusion, no gift tax return
will be required.237
The 1997 Act's special five year election238 permits front-loading of the
contributions, but that produces complications of its own because it requires
a gift tax return where none would have been required had the contributions
been actually made over five separate years in an amount not in excess of the
annual exclusion. Moreover, if the donor dies during the five year period, one
must contend with the estate inclusion rule.239 Finally, as a matter of wealth
transfer taxation policy, this type of front-loading is an extraordinary estate
depleting preference that ostensibly can be utilized only by the very wealthy
who can afford such large lump sum cash gifts, the group for which wealth
transfer taxes are retained. The benefits of the front-loading can be multiplied
by making maximum gifts on behalf of multiple beneficiaries, such as
contributions for several grandchildren. Although opinions may differ on the
235. Consistent with current law, the contribution would alsobe exempt from the GSTr. See I.RC.
§ 2642(c).
236. 1997 Act, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 21 l(b)(3)(A), 111 Stat. 788, 810-11 (current version at I.R.C.
§ 529(c)(2)).
237. Id.
238. Id., 111 Stat. at 811 (current version at I.R.C. § 529(c)(2)(B)).
239. Id. § 21 1(b)(3)(B), 111 Stat. at 811 (current version at I.R.C. § 529(c)(4)(C)).
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significance of this provision,24 ° the five year election should be eliminated
because of its potential for abuse.
If the donor is not the account owner and has no retained power over or
rights to the plan assets, the account should not be included in the donor's
estate. This approach would preserve an estate planning incentive for
transfers to § 529 plans, but would be a result consistent with fundamental
wealth transfer tax principles.
If the account owner is not the donor, there should be a completed gift to
the account owner for contributions made. Because the account owner has the
equivalent of a general power of appointment, the account proceeds should be
included in the account owner's estate. Estate planning techniques would
probably emerge that emphasize naming the designated beneficiary as the
account owner, assuming that the designated beneficiary has little wealth to
comprise a taxable estate, as well as a lower probability of dying while there
are unconsumed account assets. Of course, many donors would not want an
240. The benefits of front-loading the gifts might be quantified as follows, assuming a five percent
growth rate:







Make Lump Sum Gift, January 1





0 3,343 70,195 + 6,374
Interest Rate = 5.0%
If the donor lives for the five years, the "estate depletion" is the potential growth of the excess donation
during such time before it would otherwise be available (and made) as annual exclusion gifts. The principal
of the gift is not an estate depleting transfer because it is included in the estate of the donor who dies before
the expiration ofthe five years, but even then there is an advantage because only the original gifted amount
is included, not any appreciation. I.RC. § 529(c)(4)(C). Assuming the donor survives for five years and
the account eams a five percent return per year, the front-loading produces about $6300 of additional
growth per donee than is possible if the gifts were made $11,000 per year. The advantage would be
multiplied by the number of donees, and the savings would be increased if the investment returns exceeded
the assumed five percent.
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infant or other designated beneficiary to be the account owner. A grandparent,
for example, would often prefer, from the standpoint of prudence and indirect
control, that their child be the account owner.
If the donor is also the account owner, there should be no completed gift
for contributions, but the account proceeds should be included in the account
owner's estate. The estate tax inclusion would arise only if the account
proceeds are not exhausted prior to the account owner's death, so for parents
contributing for the benefit of their children this result could be the exception.
Distributions for qualified higher education expenses would not be treated as
gifts, applying a rough analogy to § 2503(e). Distributions to individuals
other than the account owner for other than qualified higher education
expenses would be treated as a gift and, in addition, a GSTT transfer if the
generation assignment of the distributee is two or more generations below that
of the account owner.
As a precaution against the creation of potentially excessive
accumulations and manipulations of plan assets, one might retain the gift and
GSTT rule of the 1997 Act that imposes a gift tax and GSTT if a beneficiary
is a generation or more below the original designated beneficiary.24 '
However, if the plan assets are potentially included in the account owner's
estate, this should not be a concern. Indeed, this aspect points out the
dilemma posed by § 529 plans in general: in the absence of the current wealth
transfer tax exemptions, the wealth transfer taxation aspects would be a
function of the structure of the plan agreements. That structure may evolve,
rendering the underlying statutory assumptions no longer applicable. As
discussed later, there is some question whether, after all of the predictable
adaptive modifications in § 529 plan structure, changes to the statute would
produce significant additional wealth transfer tax revenues.
2. Income Tax Modifications
It is probably true that the income tax aspects of § 529 plans are
paramount, with the wealth transfer taxation aspects of secondary importance.
The future of § 529 plans will probably turn on Congress' appraisal of those
income tax benefits. However, certain modifications to the overall provisions
governing § 529 plans could play a role in improving the wealth transfer tax




considerations by removing some of the incentives for behavior that might
compromise the integrity of the wealth transfer tax system.
For example, as suggested earlier in this essay, it may be appropriate to
impose an overall cap on § 529 plan contributions for a given designated
beneficiary that would be cumulative across all § 529 plans. In addition, in
contrast with the current, pliable contribution standard, a fixed cap could be
imposed, far short of the $315,270 figure currently permitted. Even with
soaring college costs, that is a large sum and commands a large income tax
subsidy. In comparison, the estimated average 401(k) retirement balance in
2003 was only $64,600 for all participants.242
With the limits placed on the Hope Scholarship Credit, Lifetime Learning
Credit, and the Roth IRA, § 529 plans should also be subject to meaningful
limits. Also, contributions could be phased-out for higher income
taxpayers.243 Arguably, the children and grandchildren of higher income
taxpayers would not be denied access to a college education even in the
absence of a § 529 plan, so the § 529 plan provides a welcome, but
unnecessary, windfall subsidy.24 4 Limitations on the age of the designated
beneficiary, the amount of contributions, and the income levels of contributors
would make the treatment of § 529 plans more consistent with the Coverdell
Education Savings Account.245 Consideration should be given to increasing
penalties on distributions not made for qualifying higher education
expenses, 246 mindful that excessive penalties could reduce participation by
242. U.S. Employees Sluggish in Interacting with 401(k) Plans, WORKSPAN, July 1, 2004, available
at 2004 WL 69512789. This estimate was based on a study conducted by Hewitt Associates. The study
also found that the average participant was 43 years old, had 10 years of tenure, and earned a $59,000
salary. Id. A studyof § 529 plan owners found that education savers have higherincomes ($91,000 median
income) and higher net worths ($281,000 median net worth) than the rest of the population, but also as
compared to retirement savers. See Dynarksi, supra note 16, at 365. "IT]hose who take up [§] 529 and
Coverdell accounts are a relatively elite group." Id.
243. Income is an admittedly rough proxy for the wealth of the taxpayer, but here the income tax
aspects are more robust than the wealth transfer tax aspects, so this is appropriate if one likens it to the
income limitations for Roth IRAs. For a critical discussion of the imposition of phase-outs and limitations,
see generally Richard J. Kovach, A Seldom Considered Aspect of Tax Fairness and Simplification: The
Need for a Coherent Policy Perspective on the Many and Varied Dollar Limitations Contained in the
Internal Revenue Code, I PITT. TAX REV. 1 (2003) (discussing the imposition of phase-outs and
limitations).
244. "And at a time when access to higher education is increasingly becoming the ticket to economic
opportunity, the comp lete tax exemption of § 529 plans exacerbates existing incomeand wealth inequalities
and operates to perpetuate these disparities into succeeding generations." Kaplan, supra note 227, at 2000.
245. While beyond the scope of this essay, it is readily apparent that the frustrating jumble of
education incentives needs to be coordinated, simplified, and reduced in number.
246. An inclusion in taxable income plus a ten percent penalty regime applies to premature
withdrawals of assets from retirement plans. Nevertheless, by one account, less than 50% of those
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taxpayers of more moderate wealth, who would be more interested in
emergency access to the funds.24 7 Moreover, if the wealth transfer taxation
provisions were to remain in their current form, such limitations would better
prevent the use of § 529 plans for significant wealth transfer tax avoidance
purposes.
C. A Potential Empty Victory of Principles
As noted earlier, a fault of the 1996 Act's version of § 529 was
prescribing an absolute rule of estate tax inclusion, irrespective of the actual
terms of the tuition program.24 A fault of the current version of § 529 as
introduced by the 1997 Act is that it prescribes an absolute rule of estate tax
exclusion, irrespective of the actual terms of the tuition program. 49 Either
approach can be valid, depending on the desired outcome: revenue
enhancement versus not impeding incentives for desired taxpayer behavior.
Both approaches provide a simple rule that is easy to apply and there is some
value in that from the standpoint of taxpayer compliance.
Neither approach promotes national uniformity in the terms of § 529
plans, as both approaches essentially ignore the actual terms ofthe § 529 plan.
For example, the 1996 Act would include the plan assets in the gross estate of
the contributor, whether or not the contributor was also the account owner.25
individuals who receive premature distributions from retirement plans reportedly roll overthose assets into
IRAs to avoid the income tax and ten percent penalty. Edward J. Gac & Wayne M. Gazur, Tapping "Rainy
Day" Funds for the Reluctant Entrepreneur: Downsizing, Paternalism, and the Internal Revenue Code,
86 Ky. L.J. 127, 152 (1997-98). A 2003 study by Hewitt Associates analyzing data for almost 160,000
employees who left their jobs in 2002 produced better results. Eighty-seven percent of those with 401(k)
accountbalances of $5,000 or less cashed out, presumablypaying the incometax and premature withdrawal
penalty. Kelly K. Spors, Moving Pains: Rolling Over Your 401 (k) when You Leave a Job Can Be Difficult;
Here's What You Should Know, WALL ST. J., July 19, 2004, at R4,'available at 2004 WL-WSJ 56934961.
However, only twenty percent of those with 401 (k) account balances exceeding $5,000 cashed out. Id.
247. In the context of life insurance and retirement savings accounts, it has been shown that access
to the invested funds (e.g., through loan provisions) can increase participation by taxpayers of more
moderate means. Gac & Gazur, supra note 246, at 150. A study of § 529 plan ownership concluded that
the income tax and ten percent penalties imposed for nonqualifying use of plan assets can disadvantage
lower income taxpayers more than higher income taxpayers because of the greater differential in income
tax rates between the contributor and the beneficiary, who ostensibly would pay the income tax, for higher
income taxpayers. Dynarski, supra note 16, at 382-83. Professor Dynarski suggests that this result could
be altered by taxing withdrawals at the parents' tax rate and by modifying the ten percent penalty to be
proportional to the account owner's tax rate, rather than be imposed at a flat ten percent for all taxpayers.
Id.
248. See supra note 234.
249. See supra Part 111.B.2.e.
250. See supra note 234.
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The 1997 Act would exclude the plan assets from the gross estate of a
contributor/account owner who holds the power to reclaim the plan assets.25'
Still, if a more principled approach to the estate taxation of § 529 plans is
applied (i.e., one that looks to the substance of the powers created by the
§ 529 plans), that will involve more complexity. The complexity may be
reduced with experience and routine, as has been the case with life
insurance,252 but it would further shape the terms and structures of § 529
plans.
For example, if traditional wealth transfer tax principles were applied to
§ 529 plans, an estate tax sensitive donor would not become the account
owner, thereby avoiding the powers of revocation and the power to change the
designated beneficiary. An account owner who is not the donor may still be
taxable under traditional principles as the holder of a general power of
appointment, due to the refund feature." 3 One would expect that wealth
transfer tax sensitive account owners would avoid a refund feature and be
content with wielding only the power to designate beneficiaries, other than
himself or herself, to gain the benefit of retaining only a nontaxable special
power of appointment.254 This would involve a greater degree of complexity
over the current system. Even if the § 529 plan contract terms did not evolve
sufficiently, the estate tax sensitive donor could avoid the powers of
revocation by creating an irrevocable trust to invest in the § 529 plan.255
Ultimately, the thrust of the changes would be to force donor/account
owners to relinquish control over the § 529 plan or suffer the estate tax
inclusion consequences. While that is consistent with the overall structure of
the estate tax, it is relatively easy to avoid those consequences. It is easier for
wealthier taxpayers, with other available resources, to relinquish that control.
Relinquishing the refund aspect would probably reduce the attractiveness of
the § 529 plan, particularly to less wealthy donors, but only for those who are
wealthy enough to be sensitive to wealth transfer taxes.5 6
251. 1997 Act, Pub. L No. 105-34, § 21 l(b)(3)(B), I I Stat. 788, 811.
252. With proper planning, almost no life insurance proceeds should ever be includible in the
insured's gross estate if the retention of "incidents of ownership" is avoided. See I.R.C. § 2042. The
principal exception is the death of the insured within three years of the transfer of the policy, which invokes
§ 2035 of the Code. This planning is very routine and well understood by most life insurance salespeople.
253. See I.R.C. §§ 2041,2514.
254. See id.
255. See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
256. One could envision plans with various options, some for wealth transfer tax sensitive taxpayers,
others for those without wealth transfer taxation issues. Indeed, for donor/account owners of moderate
wealth, one might see § 529 plans that still offer a refund feature, because the assets could be included in
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Reforms would inevitably produce planning responses and a proliferation
of more § 529 plan ownership options, but perhaps little substantive change
beyond more transaction costs would result. One matter of substance that
would be accomplished would be forcing estate tax sensitive taxpayers to
relinquish direct control over § 529 plan accounts." 7
Nevertheless, in spite of this dreary appraisal of the end results of wealth
transfer tax reforms, § 529 plans do require some modifications. If
progressivity remains a policy goal of the income tax system, § 529 plans do
require some limitations from the perspective of income taxes. As discussed
earlier in this essay, limitations on the amount of contributions and the income
of contributors, much like the Coverdell Education Savings Account and the
Roth IRA, could focus the § 529 plan more on taxpayers who need the most
help with funding higher education.25 Eliminating much of the income tax
"magnet" of § 529 plans could also indirectly, but more fundamentally, place
more constraints on the wealth transfer tax avoidance potential of the plans.
These conclusions could very well be upset by the creation of new savings
vehicles such as the RSA and LSA discussed earlier, which could further
restrict the § 529 plan clientele to the very wealthy.259 In that event, the
wealth transfer tax provisions may indeed need to be revisited along the lines
of this Article.
the donor/account owner's estate without incurring wealth transfer taxes. One sees statements to the effect
that clients are reluctant to make irrevocable gifts, and the § 529 account refund feature helps overcome
that reluctance. E.g., Donald Jay Korn, Class Inaction: Low Enrollment in 529 College Savings Plan May
Indicate That Planners Are Waiting for Questions to Be Answered Before Assigning a Final Grade, FN.
PLAN., Apr. 1, 2004, available at 200
4 WL 55321818.
. 257. Forcing disposal of control over § 529 plan assets in order to avoid estate tax is the practical
effect of the reforms. Much of the inclusionary aspects of the estate tax are built on that principle of
retained control and disposing of control is the keyto estate taxavoidance. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 2036-2038,
2042. It may seem like a waste of resources to maintain a system that can be so easily avoided, but a review
of the case law will confirm human nature's desperate need to retain control. Disposing of control over
wealth is not a trifling matter for many individuals.
258. Ironically, although such reforms could reduce the attractiveness of § 529 plans to wealthy
taxpayers, they would not necessarily increase the attractiveness of the plans for less wealthy taxpayers.
Indeed, one study concludes that § 529 plans can have a negative impact on lower and middle income
taxpayers if the account balances are treated as an asset that reduces college financial aid awards. Dynarski,
supra note 16, at 382-83. In comparison, verywealthytaxpayers who do not otherwisequalify for financial
aid do not share that concern. Id. Although beyond the scope of this essay, it is questionable whether the
tangle of education tax subsidies provided by the Code is the best tool for distributing financial aid for
higher education, as compared with the traditional case-by-case evaluation of financial need.




Section 529 currently carves out extraordinary exceptions to established
wealth transfer taxation principles. Congress will have an opportunity to
revisit the statute before its 2011 sunset date. At the same time, Congress will
probably be assessing the role of the federal estate tax, which in 2011 is
scheduled to be restored to its pre-2001 Act status.26° Although the income
tax benefits of § 529 will probably take center stage, there will be an
opportunity to reappraise the wealth transfer tax aspects.
If Congress is interested in restoring coherence to the wealth transfer
taxation aspects of § 529, simple amendments could accomplish that. As
proposed in this essay, most of the amendments should have little impact on
the overall incentives to creating § 529 accounts, at least with respect to the
moderately wealthy taxpayer. To some extent, they would add to the
complexity of the provision, as compared with the current statute, which
provides few limits on wealth transfer tax avoidance. There is also some
question whether the changes restoring established wealth transfer taxation
principles would provide much additional limits on wealth transfer tax
avoidance after taxpayers and § 529 plans adjust to the changes.
Consequently, this essay concludes that if § 529 is to be modified, the
more appropriate focus is on limiting the income tax exemption. Dollar limits
on contributions and contribution limits on high-income taxpayers should be
considered, as well as age limits for the designated beneficiary, to create
consistency with other education incentives and the Roth IRA. Those limits
may also reduce the attractiveness of § 529 plans to wealthier individuals,
producing a correlative reduction in possible abuses of the wealth transfer tax
system.
260. I.R.C. § 2001.
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